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1.1 Introduction
This paper takes a fresh look at the historical evolution of the United
States external position over the postwar period by carefully constructing
the U.S. gross asset and liability positions since 1952 from underlying data
and applying appropriate valuations to each component.
The last two decades have been characterized by a sharp increase in in-
ternational capital ﬂows and, in particular, by a rising globalization of eq-
uity markets.1 The broadening of the set of assets internationally traded,
the switch to a ﬂoating exchange rate regime in 1973, and the larger size of
gross asset and liability positions have made it increasingly necessary to in-
corporate valuation adjustments when computing net foreign asset posi-
tions.
The net foreign asset position of a country is nothing but a leveraged
portfolio where the country is short in domestic assets and long in foreign
assets. Hence, changes in asset prices and exchange rate movements will ei-
ther tighten or relax the U.S. external constraint. For instance, everything
else equal, a depreciation of the dollar generates a capital gain on U.S. for-
eign asset holdings, which increases the return on its net foreign portfolio.
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas is an assistant professor of economics at the University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley, and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
Hélène Rey is an assistant professor of economics at Princeton University, and a faculty re-
search fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
We thank Rich Clarida, Barry Eichengreen, Richard Portes, Cédric Tille, participants at
the NBER Conference on G7 Current Account Imbalances, and, especially, our discussant
José De Gregorio for their comments.
1. These phenomena have been documented in particular in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2001) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004).
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From World Banker to 
World Venture Capitalist
U.S. External Adjustment and 
the Exorbitant Privilege
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Hélène ReyAs of December 2004, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) reports a
U.S. net foreign asset position of –$2.5 trillion (or 22 percent of gross do-
mestic product [GDP]), with assets representing $10 trillion (85 percent of
GDP) and liabilities $12.5 trillion (107 percent of GDP). Almost all U.S.
foreign liabilities are in dollars, whereas approximately 70 percent of U.S.
foreign assets are in foreign currencies. Hence a 10 percent depreciation of
the dollar represents, ceteris paribus, a transfer of around 5.9 percent of
U.S. GDP from the rest of the world to the United States. For comparison,
the trade deﬁcit on goods and services was 5.3 percent of GDP in 2004.
These capital gains can therefore be very large.2
This paper revisits a number of historical stylized facts about the U.S. ex-
ternal adjustment in light of the new data that we have put together.3 Of
particular interest to us is the idea that the United States’s unique position
in the international monetary order allows it to enjoy an “exorbitant priv-
ilege,” in the famous words attributed to de Gaulle in 1965.4 The speciﬁc
deﬁnition of this exorbitant privilege has varied over time and with diﬀer-
ent commentators. For some, it refers to the fact that the U.S.’s income bal-
ance has remained positive all these years, despite mounting net liabilities.
For others—and this was the interpretation favored by the French in the
1960s—the exorbitant privilege referred to the ability of the United States
to run large direct investment surpluses, ultimately ﬁnanced by the is-
suance of dollars held sometimes involuntarily by foreign central banks.
This particular interpretation views the United States as playing a pivotal
role at the center of the world ﬁnancial system. In the words of Kindle-
berger (1965) and Despres, Kindleberger, and Salant (1966), the United
States was the “Banker of the World,” “lending mostly at long and inter-
mediate terms, and borrowing short” thereby supplying loans and invest-
ment funds to foreign enterprises and liquidity to foreign asset holders.
Since then, the United States has become an increasingly leveraged ﬁnan-
cial intermediary as world capital markets have become more and more in-
tegrated. Hence, a more accurate description of the United States in the
last decade may be one of the “Venture Capitalist of the World,” issuing
short-term and ﬁxed-income liabilities and investing primarily in equity
and direct investment abroad. While the latter interpretation of the exorbi-
tant privilege is, of course, consistent with the former, it is conceptually dis-
tinct. The United States’s excess return of its external assets over liabilities
may come from a return eﬀect (higher returns within each asset class) or
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2. See also Tille (2003, 2004).
3. We present in appendix A a line-by-line description of the database we use in this paper
and in Gourinchas and Rey (2005).
4. In fact, the quote is nowhere to be found in de Gaulle’s speeches. It is actually Valéry Gis-
card d’Estaing, Finance Minister at the time, who spoke of an “exorbitant privilege” in Feb-
ruary 1965. He was then cited by Raymond Aron in Le Figaro, February 16, 1965, from Les
Articles du Figaro, vol. II (Paris: Editions de Fallois, 1994), 1475. We thank Andrew Moravc-
sik and Georges-Henri Soutou for this information.from a composition eﬀect (the structure of the balance sheet is asymmetric
with more low yielding assets on the liability side). One contribution of this
paper is to present a break up of the exorbitant privilege into these return
and composition eﬀects over the whole postwar period.
We begin by presenting our estimates of the net foreign asset position of
the United States between 1952 and 2004 in section 1.2. In particular, we
compare our results to the oﬃcial numbers. Section 1.3 provides a ﬁrst his-
torical measure of the exorbitant privilege by estimating yields and total re-
turns on the net foreign assets of the United States between 1952 and now.
We show that our data support the notion that the United States enjoyed a
substantial premium on its gross assets relative to its liabilities and that this
premium has been increasing since the collapse of the Bretton Woods ﬁxed
exchange rate system.
Section 1.4 studies the evolution of the composition of gross assets and
liabilities and relates it to the role of the United States as the world venture
capitalist. We ﬁnd that a nonnegligible fraction of the exorbitant privilege
comes from the risk premium that the United States enjoys, even though
the major part of the exorbitant privilege comes from return diﬀerentials
between U.S. and foreign assets within each class of assets. Finally, in sec-
tion 1.5, we present simple estimates of the amount of depreciation of the
U.S. dollar needed to wipe out given amounts of U.S. external debt via both
the valuation and trade channels.
1.2 Measurement of the U.S. External Asset Position
1.2.1 The U.S. Net Foreign Asset Position Reconstructed: 1952–2004
We ﬁrst set the stage with a comparison of various estimates of the U.S.
net foreign asset position. The methodological details on the construction
of our own estimates are provided in appendix A. Brieﬂy, the main draw-
back of the oﬃcial series is that they generally measure the U.S. external
investment position not at current prices but at historical cost. It is well
known, for example, that the current account is measured at historical
cost. This implies that the oﬃcial statistics are inappropriate to study val-
uation eﬀects. Hence, we construct market value estimates of each asset
and liability category from 1952 by combining data from the BEA’s inter-
national investment positions data (after 1980) and data on international
transactions from both the BEA and the Flow of Funds. We compute dol-
lar capital gains or losses for each asset category (equity, bonds, foreign di-
rect investment [FDI], bank loans and trade credit) and apply those valu-
ation adjustments to our international investment position series. We use
available Treasury benchmark surveys on external asset and liabilities to
form estimates of the currency and country weights in the U.S. investment
portfolio. Our constructed series give, therefore, a quarterly account of
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by asset class.
Figure 1.1 reports three diﬀerent measures of the U.S. net foreign asset
position. We denote by NFAt our constructed net foreign asset position at
the end of period t. Figure 1.1 also reports the naive estimate obtained
from cumulating current accounts,5 as well as the BEA’s estimates of the
U.S. international investment position (IIP) at market value since 1982.
The three series exhibit a striking common trend: the United States went
from a sizable creditor position in 1952 (15 percent of GDP) to a large
debtor position (–26 percent of GDP) by the end of the period. According
to our data, the United States became a net debtor around 1988, which is
roughly similar to the oﬃcial data with valuation eﬀects (1989). Our NFA
series is also reassuringly close to the BEA’s IIP estimates available only af-
ter 1982, in spite of a diﬀerent approach to valuing direct investment posi-
tions.
While the general tendency of the three measures is the same, ﬁgure 1.1
reveals that valuation components have an important inﬂuence on the
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Fig. 1.1 U.S. net foreign assets, relative to GDP, 1952:1 to 2004:1
Sources: BEA (http://www.bea.gov) and authors’ calculations.
5. Starting from our estimate of NFA in 1952:1. The current account data are from the Na-
tional Income and Products Accounts (NIPA, table 4.1) since the balance-of-payments (BOP)
data only extend back to 1960. There are small diﬀerences between the BOP and the NIPA
deﬁnitions of the current account. These are largely irrelevant for our analysis.short- to medium-run dynamics of the U.S. external position. We deﬁne the
valuation component as the diﬀerence between our measure (NFA) and the
cumulated current account series (Σ CA). It reﬂects exactly the cumulated
value of the capital gains and exchange rate adjustments omitted from the
current account measure. Figure 1.2 reports this net valuation component
as a share of GDP and highlights a number of interesting facts.
First, during the Bretton Woods period and until 1977, the cumulated
current account measure tended to overestimate the NFA position of the
United States, by up to 4 percent of GDP. Since then, valuation eﬀects
worked in favor of the U.S., and reached a peak of 9.4 percent of GDP in
1994:3. The ﬁgure reveals a striking correlation: the valuation component
was on average negative while the United States was a net creditor and pos-
itive after the United States became a net debtor. The startling implication
is that over the entire period, and with the exception of a few years, the val-
uation component worked to stabilize the net foreign asset position of the
United States and oﬀset current account movements.
Second, the evolution of the valuation component is consistent with the
broad evolutions of the U.S. dollar. The period of the dollar depreciation
after 1985 as well as the more recent depreciation can be clearly identiﬁed
on the ﬁgure, associated with an increase in the valuation component.
Conversely, between 1995 and 2003 the valuation component largely dis-
appeared while the dollar appreciated.
Third, there are a few important exceptions to that pattern. Most dra-
matically, we observe a dramatic turnaround in the valuation component
in 1977 to 1980. Between 1976:4 and 1980:2, the valuation components
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Fig. 1.2 Net valuation component (relative to GDP)shifts from –3.6 percent to 5.9 percent of GDP, a total shift representing
about 10 percent of GDP. During that period, the returns on U.S. gross for-
eign assets far exceeded the returns on U.S. gross liabilities. This was in
large part due to low returns on U.S. equities. The U.S. stock market dra-
matically underperformed the foreign stock markets over that period,
which substantially increased the value of U.S. net foreign assets.6
1.2.2 Gross External Positions and Valuations
One additional beneﬁt of reconstructing the net foreign asset position
from the underlying disaggregated data is that we can document the time
evolution of the gross assets and liabilities separately. Figures 1.3 and 1.4
report the naive construction of gross asset and liability positions, starting
in 1960 and cumulating the corresponding balance of payment ﬂows, to-
gether with our estimates. The diﬀerence between the two series provides a
direct estimate of the valuation component on the underlying gross posi-
tions (ﬁgure 1.5 reports the two valuation components side by side).
We observe ﬁrst that the share of U.S. gross assets in GDP remained
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6. During this period, the annual dollar capital gain on the U.S. stock market averaged only
2.2 percent, while the same return was 31.7 percent on the U.K. stock market and 18.3 per-
cent on the Japanese stock market. These two countries accounted for 38 percent of U.S. eq-
uity assets (see table 1B.2 in appendix B).
Fig. 1.3 Gross assets position and cumulated U.S.-owned foreign assets (relative 
to GDP)Fig. 1.4 Gross liability position and cumulated foreign-owned U.S. assets (relative
to GDP)
Fig. 1.5 Valuation eﬀects, gross foreign assets, and gross foreign liabilities 
(relative to GDP)stable or even slightly declining between 1952 and 1975 (ﬁgure 1.3). Start-
ing in 1975, it has grown rapidly, reaching 80 percent of GDP in 2000. The
share of U.S. gross liabilities in GDP, on the other hand, has increased
throughout the postwar period, with a sharp acceleration post-1980 (ﬁgure
1.4).
The valuation component on the gross positions is an order of magni-
tude larger than on the net positions. It accounts for 45 percent of gross as-
sets and 30 percent of gross liabilities in 2000 and around 35 percent of
GDP. The evolution of that component reﬂects the evolution of asset re-
turns. Both valuation components grew rapidly over time until 2000 (ﬁgure
1.5). Then they declined precipitously as asset prices around the world col-
lapsed.
1.3 The Exorbitant Privilege Part I: Yields and Total Returns
Now that the stage is set, we begin our analysis of the external balance
of the United States. We start with the famous observation that the large
increase in U.S. net liabilities to the rest of the world has not been accom-
panied by a commensurate increase in net income payments. It is well
known that the income account has remained positive for the United States
despite gross liabilities exceeding assets by approximately 34 percent in
2004. In other words, the income generated by the (smaller) U.S.-owned as-
sets abroad is larger than the income paid on the (larger) foreign-owned as-
sets in the United States. This observation is sometimes taken as evidence
that the United States enjoys an exorbitant privilege in the sense that it can
borrow at a discount on world ﬁnancial markets. Figure 1.6 presents the
annual yield on the NFA as a percent of GDP, since 1960. Despite a sub-
stantial drop in the mid 1980s, it remained positive throughout the period.
One should recognize, however, that the yield represents only one com-
ponent of the total return on U.S. gross external assets and liabilities. The
other component is the dollar capital gain or loss due to asset price and
currency ﬂuctuations. Figure 1.6 reports our estimate of the total annual
return on the net foreign asset portfolio as a percent of GDP.
The ﬁrst striking observation is the volatility of total returns relative to
yields, especially after 1975. Total returns ﬂuctuate between –3.4 and 6.4
percent of GDP, while the income balance represents between 0.09 and 1.2
percent of GDP (we can see on this ﬁgure the large total return between
1976 and 1980 that underlies the turnaround in the valuation component
as well as the eﬀect of the depreciation of the dollar after 1985).
Second, total returns can be substantially negative. The annual return
(relative to GDP) was indeed negative in all but two years from 1995 to
2001, a period during which the dollar appreciated substantially.
Third, despite this substantial volatility, the average total return on as-
sets and liabilities is consistent with the evidence on yields. Over the sample
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bilities (3.61 percent) is substantially smaller than the annualized average
real rate of return on gross assets (5.72 percent). The diﬀerence, 2.11 per-
cent, is quite considerable.7
Moreover, if anything, the puzzle has increased over time. Our estimates
indicate that the average total return on assets during the Bretton Woods
period (4.04 percent) was only 26 basis points larger than the average total
return on gross liabilities (3.78 percent). Since 1973, however, the gap has
widened enormously. The post-Bretton Woods average asset return is 6.82
percent, while the corresponding total liability return is only 3.50 percent.
The excess return reaches an astonishing 3.32 percent (see ﬁgure 1.7).
Hence, the exorbitant privilege puzzle is reinforced when one looks at to-
tal returns.
We can use these historical averages to assess the tipping point beyond
which we should expect the United States to pay more on its gross liabili-
ties than it earns on its gross assets. The calculation, ﬁrst proposed by
Obstfeld and Taylor (2005), goes as follows. The tipping point is deﬁned
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Fig. 1.6 Yield and total return on NFA (in percent, annual rate, relative to GDP)
Sources: U.S. international transactions (BEA; http://www.bea.gov) and authors’ calcula-
tions.
7. These returns are reported in table 1.1. For a study disentangling the eﬀect of capital
gains, investment ﬂows and trade balance on the accumulation of net foreign assets of diﬀer-
ent countries see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (chap. 2 in this volume).as that ratio of gross liabilities to gross assets beyond which r ˜aA – r ˜ lL be-
comes negative, where r ˜ a (respectively r ˜ l) denotes an estimate of the nomi-
nal average total return on gross assets A (resp. liabilities L).
Using the nominal historical values of r ˜ a and r ˜ l, we estimate a tipping
point L/ A  r ˜ a/r ˜ l   1.30.8 The implication of the exorbitant privilege is
that a 2 percent excess return allows the United States to accumulate debt
exceeding its gross assets by 30 percent and yet still be a recipient of posi-
tive investment income. Because the exorbitant privilege of the United
States has increased over time, the tipping point has also been pushed back
substantially. Calculated using the average returns over the Bretton Woods
period, we estimate a tipping point of only 1.04. Using the post-Bretton
Woods period estimates of returns, the tipping point now reaches an as-
tonishing 1.43.
Interestingly, our estimates of the net foreign asset position of the United
States suggest that the leverage ratio L/A has increased steadily over the
period from 0.3 in 1952 to 0.73 in 1973, reached 1.09 in 1991 and, ﬁnally,
1.34 in 2004. Hence, the United States may be getting close to the position
where it will have to start making net payments to the rest of the world.
Of course, this simple computation ignores the endogeneity of the re-
turns on gross assets and liabilities. Reaching the tipping point where the
20 Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Hélène Rey
Fig. 1.7 Annual real return on gross assets and gross liabilities (1952–2004)
8. The values of the nominal returns on assets and liabilities r ˜a and r ˜l are, respectively, for
the whole sample 9.15 percent and 7.04 percent; for the Bretton Woods period, 6.32 percent
and 6.06 percent; for the post-Bretton Woods period, 11.00 percent and 7.69 percent.United States for the ﬁrst time since the second World War ceases to have
a positive net return on its net assets could be seen by the market as a sig-
niﬁcant blow to the credibility of the dollar. In a context where the exter-
nal net worth of the United States is negative and the return on its net as-
sets also turns negative, market participants could start demanding a
higher premium on their dollar assets, thereby setting oﬀ unstable dynam-
ics. This may also aﬀect the structure of market participants’ borrowing:
for example, they could start to coordinate on another international cur-
rency, such as the euro, to provide liquidity. They could also abandon
short-term, low-yield U.S. securities such as T-Bills for higher yielding as-
sets (equity, FDI).9 This would considerably change the external balance
sheet of the United States and narrow the gap between the total return on
U.S. assets and liabilities, further deepening the adjustment problem. As
the gap between the return on gross assets and gross liabilities declines, the
net interest burden would rise rapidly, setting oﬀ further moves away from
U.S. assets. While this is a possible scenario, we stress that understanding
the dynamics of the composition of international portfolios, asset returns,
and the exchange rate requires a dynamic general equilibrium model of the
world economy, which is well beyond the scope of this paper.
1.4 The Exorbitant Privilege Part II: The United States 
as World Venture Capitalist
1.4.1 Composition of the Gross Asset and Liability Position
We now turn our attention to the structure of gross assets and liabilities
and its evolution over time. This structure is particularly interesting in the
case of the United States, which has been the center country of the Bretton
Woods system since 1944 and has remained the most important ﬁnancial
center in the world, even after the collapse of the ﬁxed exchange rate
regime.
The United States has succeeded the United Kingdom as the “Banker of
the World” and the issuer of the main international currency. This means,
in particular, being able to borrow short (foreigners are willing to purchase
liquid dollar assets) and lend long (the United States supplies long-term
loans and investment funds to foreign enterprises). Just like a bank, the
United States can extract an intermediation margin, given by the (positive)
return diﬀerential between external assets and liabilities. During the whole
period, U.S. assets have shifted more and more out of long-term bank
loans toward FDI and, since the 1990s, toward FDI and equity. At the
same time, its liabilities have remained dominated by bank loans, trade
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9. Witness the recent attempts by China to move away from U.S. treasuries and into direct
investment (Maytag, Unocal, IBM).credit, and debt, that is, low-yield safe assets. Hence, the U.S. balance sheet
resembles increasingly one of a venture capitalist with high-return risky in-
vestments on the asset side. Furthermore, its leverage ratio has increased
sizably over time.
The currency denomination of securities is also rather speciﬁc. The is-
suer of the international currency is able to denominate its entire stock of
liabilities in dollars, thereby shifting the exchange rate exposure to the rest
of the world. This key characteristic of the external balance sheet of the
United States, shared to some extent by other developed countries, is in-
strumental in the stabilization of the external accounts of these countries.
As pointed out in Gourinchas and Rey (2005), a depreciation of the U.S.
dollar has two beneﬁcial eﬀects on the external position. It helps to in-
crease net exports (trade adjustment channel), and it also increases the dol-
lar value of U.S. assets (valuation channel).
Figures 1.8 and 1.9 present our estimates of the ratio of each asset class
to GDP. Several interesting episodes can be read from these graphs: (a) the
petrodollar recycling in the 1970s until the Latin American debt crisis of
1982 (see the large increase in “other assets”—mostly bank loans over that
period—followed by a stagnation and a decrease); (b) the erosion of the
home bias in equity portfolios at the end of the 1990s (particularly spectac-
ular in the U.S. asset portfolio); (c) the bursting of the equity market bubble
in 2000 to 2001 (which aﬀects both the U.S. gross assets and liabilities).
During the 1960s, the United States was running moderate current ac-
count surpluses but was investing sizable amounts abroad in the form of
FDI. The share of FDI steadily increased between 1952 and 1973, from
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Fig. 1.8 U.S. gross external asset (share of GDP), 1952–2004
Source: Authors’ calculations.zero to 40 percent of gross external asset positions. On February 4, 1965,
the French president de Gaulle famously complained in a press conference
at the Elysée Palace that an increase in the U.S. money supply was leading
to increased capital outﬂows from the United States and “for some coun-
tries to a sort of expropriation of their enterprises.” For de Gaulle, the role
of the dollar as the international currency meant that the United States
could borrow money from the rest of the world free of charge. By printing
dollars and using them to purchase foreign companies, it was claimed, the
United States was abusing its hegemonic position at the center of the in-
ternational monetary system. But these long-term capital outﬂows led to a
continuous drain of the U.S. gold reserves, despite the numerous and futile
attempts by the United States to limit the size of the balance of payments
deﬁcit. This is visible in ﬁgure 1.8 where a sharp increase in FDI assets is
matched almost one for one by a decrease in other assets. As ﬁgure 1.10
documents, a substantial share of the decline in other assets was due to the
drain on U.S. gold reserves. Successive U.S. administrations used various
expedients such as the interest equalization tax, voluntary restraint pro-
grams, restrictions on tourism, oﬀset agreements, and sheer political pres-
sure on foreign central banks (especially the Bundesbank and the Bank of
Japan) to prevent dollars held abroad from being converted into gold. De-
spite these interventions, the credibility of the convertibility of the dollar
waned over time, and the tensions on the foreign exchange markets culmi-
nated in 1970 and 1972 to 1973, with successive runs on the dollar that trig-
gered the collapse of the ﬁxed exchange rate system of Bretton Woods.
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Fig. 1.9 U.S. gross external liabilities (share of GDP), 1952–2004
Source: Authors’ calculations.The abandonment of gold parity, however, did not lead to the demise of
the dollar as the main international currency.10 The United States has re-
mained the world liquidity provider ever since. As shown in ﬁgure 1.11, the
share of liquid liabilities (deﬁned as debt, trade credits, and bank loans) in
total U.S. liabilities has gone down only slightly, from roughly 70 percent
in 1973 to around 60 percent in 2004 (the decrease of the end of the 1990s
is due to the equity bubble). This constitutes a remarkably high share of to-
tal liabilities. It reﬂects the high demand from the rest of the world for liq-
uid U.S. securities as a transaction medium, reserve or store of value, both
during Bretton Woods and after the collapse of the ﬁxed exchange rate
regime.
Over the same period, the share of high-yield risky investment increased
considerably. From a conservative world banker, the United States became
a bold world venture capitalist. The share of risky assets in total assets in-
creased continuously during the Bretton Woods era, as growing FDI out-
ﬂows led to a decrease in gold reserves. This gold drain was stopped in 1973
once the Nixon Administration decided to end the convertibility of the dol-
lar. After the emerging market debt crisis of the 1980s and the deregulation
of equity markets of the 1990s, the growth in FDI and portfolio equity
ﬂows gathered pace so that by 2004, the share of risky assets in the total
asset portfolio of the United States reached about 60 percent, against
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Fig. 1.10 U.S. other gross assets and gold (share of GDP), 1952–2004
10. See Portes and Rey (1998) for a review of the dominant position of the U.S. dollar in the
international monetary system.roughly 50 percent in 1973. Hence the collapse of Bretton Woods has not
deprived the United States of its fundamental role as world liquidity
provider. This upward trend in the share of high-yielding risky assets is
consistent with the increase over time of the (positive) return diﬀerential
between assets and liabilities, as documented in the previous section.11
1.4.2 Total Returns
The yields that the United States receives on its external assets are higher
that the yields that it pays on its liabilities. In the previous section, we
showed that this is also true for the aggregate total returns on the net for-
eign asset position of the United States. We now look at total returns on
gross assets and liabilities and on each class of assets independently. Table
1.1 presents estimates of average total real annual returns on the diﬀerent
subcomponents of assets and liabilities for the whole sample, the Bretton
Woods period and the ﬂoating exchange rate regime.12We denote by ra, the
return on gross assets; rl, the return on gross liabilities; rae, the return on eq-
uities; rad, the return on debt; raf, the return on FDI; and rao, the return on
others (all returns are real). Symmetrically, rle denotes the return on for-
eigners’ holdings of U.S. equity (in other words, U.S. equity liabilities); rlf,
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Fig. 1.11 Share of risky assets in all assets and share of liquid liabilities in all lia-
bilities (1952–2004)
11. It would be of great interest to compare the balance sheet of the United States to those
of other developed countries more precisely. This is the undertaking of Obstfeld and Taylor
(2005).
12. See appendix B for details on how we computed the returns.the return on FDI liability; rld and rlo, the return on debt and other liabil-
ity, respectively.
Several features are noteworthy. First, as we already mentioned, over the
whole period, the United States gained a sizable excess return in real terms
on assets over liabilities (2.11 percent  5.72 percent – 3.61 percent). This ex-
cess return is especially large during the ﬂoating exchange rate period (be-
tween 1973 and 2004, it is equal to 3.32 percent in real terms). Considering
each asset in turn, the United States earns an average of 340 basis points (bp)
excess return yearly on its equity assets (rae versus rle), 384 bp on its debt (rad
versus rld) and 214 bp on its bank loan and trade credits (rao versus rlo). By
contrast, the United States does not seem to enjoy sizable superior returns
on its direct investment abroad. The excess return is only 1 bp (rafversus rlf).
Second, there is a sizable gap between returns on the safe assets (debt
and others) and the returns on risky assets (equity and FDI). During the
1950s and the 1960s, foreigners earned a very low real return on U.S. debt
(0.80 percent, on average): de Gaulle was not that far oﬀwhen he was talk-
ing of the U.S. debt being free of charge. With the advent of the ﬂoating ex-
change rate regime, the real returns on debt became even lower (0.32 per-
cent on average).
Third, the volatility of all returns has increased signiﬁcantly after the
collapse of Bretton Woods so that the Sharpe ratios of assets have in gen-
eral declined during the ﬂoating exchange rate regime.
1.4.3 A Break Up of Total Returns
The large positive excess real return of gross assets over gross liabilities
can be broken up into a composition eﬀect and a return eﬀect. The U.S. lia-
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Table 1.1 Descriptive statistics: Average quarterly total real returns (annualized; %)
Total real returns ra rl rae raf rad rao rle rlf rld rlo
A. Summary statistics (1952:1–2004:1)
Mean 5.72 3.61 13.68 9.57 4.35 3.43 10.28 9.56 0.51 1.19
Standard 
deviation 11.98 10.49 39.76 23.10 15.94 9.33 36.70 24.18 13.09 4.91
Sharpe ratio 47.73 34.40 34.39 41.43 27.31 36.78 28.02 39.56 3.87 24.29
B. Summary statistics (1952:1–1973:1)
Mean 4.04 3.78 10.83 9.44 4.82 2.40 11.59 9.96 0.80 1.24
Standard 
deviation 4.79 9.60 36.83 16.32 17.67 1.75 36.29 21.33 10.66 1.32
Sharpe ratio 84.51 39.34 29.41 57.85 27.29 137.10 31.93 46.68 7.47 94.63
C. Summary statistics (1973:1–2004:1)
Mean 6.82 3.50 15.54 9.65 4.05 4.11 9.43 9.31 0.32 1.16
Standard 
deviation 18.84 11.07 41.61 26.69 14.77 11.89 37.09 25.96 14.50 6.24
Sharpe ratio 45.91 31.60 37.35 36.16 27.40 34.54 25.43 35.85 2.19 18.58bilities are dominated by low-yield safe securities, whereas U.S. assets con-
tain a large (and increasing over time) share of FDI and equity. The United
States can be therefore characterized as a very leveraged investor, which is
increasingly shorting low-yield securities to buy high-yield investments.
This is the composition eﬀect. But there is also a return eﬀect. Within each
class of assets, the preceding discussion showed that the United States
earned higher returns on its assets than on its liabilities. This return eﬀect
represents the other dimension of the exorbitant privilege and could occur,
in particular, because of a liquidity discount for the issuer of the interna-
tional currency as discussed in Portes and Rey (1998). Formally, we can de-
compose the return on assets ra and the return on liabilities rl as
ra    aerae    adrad    afraf    aorao
rl    lerle    ldrld    lfrlf    alrlo,
where  ae,  af,  ao, and  ad are the weights on equity, FDI, other foreign as-
sets (bank loans and trade credit) and debt in total assets. Notations for the
liability side are deﬁned in an entirely symmetric fashion.
We can then write the expected excess return of assets over liabilities as
E(ra   rl)   E[   
o(rao   rlo)]   E[   
d(rad   rld)]   E[   
e(rae   rle)] 
  E[   
f(raf   rlf)]   E[( ad    ld) (r  
d   r  
o)] 
  E[( ae    le)(r  
e   r  
o)]   E[( af    lf) (r  
f   r  
o)],
where E denotes the expectation sign,    
i   ( ai   li)/2 is the average port-
folio share for asset class i and r  
i   (rai   rli)/2 is the average return on as-
set class i. The ﬁrst four terms represent the return eﬀect. They denote the
average excess return on external assets relative to liabilities within each
class of assets. This return eﬀect is zero if the return is the same within each
asset class (rai   rli).
The last three terms represent the composition eﬀect. It quantiﬁes the
diﬀerence in weights between assets and liabilities for equity, FDI, and
debt. The composition eﬀect is zero if U.S. external assets have the same
composition as U.S. external liabilities ( ai    li).13
In table 1.2, we analyze the relative importance of the composition and
return eﬀects in explaining the high return enjoyed by the United States on
its net foreign asset position. All the returns are in percentage terms.
We ﬁrst observe that the return eﬀect plays a dominant part in explain-
ing the excess return of the U.S. net foreign asset portfolio. We ﬁnd that it
accounts for 1.97 percent of the 2.11 percent total excess return over the
entire sample, 1.23 percent during the Bretton Woods period, and 2.45 per-
cent since 1973. The return eﬀect is especially signiﬁcant for the short-term
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13. The shares  ai and  li are time-varying. Hence, the overall excess return depends also
upon the covariance between asset returns and shares.liquid assets (other and debt) where it accounts for about half of the total
excess return (1.56 percent of the total 2.11 percent). It is smaller in the
other asset classes, although it remains positive for all asset classes on all
subsamples.
The composition eﬀect plays a smaller role over the entire sample (0.14
percent), but its relevance has increased signiﬁcantly over time, from –0.96
percent before 1973 to 0.86 percent since then. Hence, between a quarter
and a third of the current excess return (3.32 percent) can be explained by
the asymmetry in the U.S. external balance sheet and the fact that the
United States earns an equity premium. Looking at the subcomponents of
this composition eﬀect, we ﬁnd that most of it arises from the asymmetry
in direct investment (0.70 percent). The increased contribution of the com-
position term, however, reﬂects mostly the increased symmetry in equity
positions (from –1.46 percent to –0.02 percent), reﬂecting the decrease of
home bias in U.S. portfolios (the share of foreign equity in U.S. portfolios
has risen over time).
1.5 Exchange Rate Adjustment
Current external imbalances can be compensated either by future trade
surpluses or by future favorable returns on the net foreign asset position of
the United States. In this section, we perform a simple exercise, meant to
illustrate the joint capacity of the valuation channel and of the more tradi-
tional trade channel to stabilize the external accounts of the United States.
Gourinchas and Rey (2005) show that the valuation channel operates at
short to medium horizons, while the trade channel operates in the medium
to long run. Historically, the valuation channel has contributed around 30
percent of the process of international adjustment.
The exercise we perform in this section should be taken with a lot of cau-
tion and is meant to be illustrative as we do not have a structural model of
the U.S. and foreign economies. The elasticities presented in table 1.3 in
particular are dependent on the underlying model of the economy and of
the shocks.
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Table 1.2 Break-up of total real returns in a return and a composition eﬀect
Return eﬀect Composition eﬀect Total
Other Debt Equity FDI Total Debt Equity FDI Total ra – rl
Period (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) to (4) (5) (6) (7) (5) to (7) (1) to (7)
1952–2004 1.00 0.56 0.35 0.06 1.97 0.03 –0.59 0.70 0.14 2.11
1952–1973 0.69 0.38 0.04 0.12 1.23 –0.23 –1.46 0.73 –0.96 0.27
1973–2004 1.21 0.68 0.55 0.01 2.45 0.20 –0.02 0.68 0.86 3.321.5.1 Theory
We start from the law of accumulation of foreign assets between t and
t   1:
(1) NFAt 1   Rt 1NFAt   NXt 1,
where NXt represents net exports, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between ex-
ports Xtand imports Mtand net foreign assets NFAtis deﬁned as the diﬀer-
ence between gross foreign assets At and gross foreign liabilities Lt mea-
sured in domestic currency at the end of period t. Equation (1) states that
the net foreign position increases with net exports and with the total return
on the net foreign asset portfolio Rt 1. Dividing through by U.S. GDP Y t,
and using lowercase letters to denote normalized variables (so that nfat  
NFAt/Y t), we obtain
(2) nfat 1   nfat   nxt 1,
where gt 1 represents the growth rate of output between t and t   1.
Net exports and the return on the net foreign asset positions are both
aﬀected by movements in the exchange rate. In the case of the United
States, a dollar depreciation helps on both counts. It stimulates net exports
and it increases the dollar value of U.S. assets, thereby improving the return
on the net foreign asset position. This is because most U.S. liabilities are in
dollars, whereas a share of U.S. assets are in foreigncurrency.14We estimate
the magnitude of a devaluation needed, ceteris paribus, for the U.S. net for-
eign debt and the U.S. net exports to satisfy the following long-run equi-
librium (steady state) condition, obtained from equation (1):
(3) nx   1     nfa,
where variables without time subscript denote steady state values. Numer-




Rt 1  
gt 1
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Table 1.3 Elasticities of asset and liability returns to exchange rate changes
Horizon h Horizon h
(years) (years)
h   13 5 h   13 5
 h
a 0.28 0.26 0.19  l
h –0.08 –0.15 –0.14
Standard error (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) Standard error (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
r  
a
h (annualized) 6.64% 6.96% 7.52% r  
l
h (annualized) 3.6% 4.04% 4.44%
14. In contrast, for an emerging market with dollarized liabilities, a depreciation will be
destabilizing.year in gross terms). R is the steady-state rate of return on the net foreign
asset position. From Gourinchas and Rey (2005), we know that R   g/ ,
where   is a growth-adjusted discount factor, a function of steady state
weights on exports, imports, assets, and liabilities. Empirically, we assume
that   0.95, which implies that R   1.033/0.95   1.0874 (the net steady-
state return on the net foreign asset position is therefore equal to 8.74 per-
cent). Given these estimates, we ﬁnd a long-run ratio of net exports to net
foreign assets equal to nx/nfa   1 – R/g   –5.26%.
Next, we need to quantify the eﬀect of an exchange rate depreciation on
net exports and on the net foreign asset portfolio return. Estimates in the
literature imply that a 1 percent increase in the ratio of net exports to GDP
requires a depreciation of 11 to 20 percent of the exchange rate (see Blan-
chard, Giavazzi, and Sa 2005). We pick two estimates: a middle range esti-
mate of 15 percent and a low estimate of 10 percent. Hence, we assume
(4) dnx    ,
where   is taken to be 1/15 or 1/10.
We now assess the eﬀect of a change in the exchange rate on the ﬁrst term
on the right-hand side of (2). Using the deﬁnition of Rt 1, we can write
Rt 1nfat   ra
t 1at   rl
t 1lt.
In the absence of a general equilibrium model of portfolio allocation and
equilibrium returns, we make the assumption that the asset composition of
the net foreign asset position remains constant relative to GDP over the pe-
riod considered. Hence, the response of the net foreign asset position to
changes in the exchange rate is solely determined by the response of the re-
turns on assets and liabilities to exchange rate changes:
dRt 1nfat   dra
t 1at   drl
t 1lt
We use historical data of the ﬂoating exchange rate period to estimate
the elasticity of the dollar returns on gross assets and liabilities to the ex-
change rate for a given horizon h. To do so, we estimate regressions of the
form:
ra
t,h   r  
a
h    h
a
rl
t,h   r  
b
h    l
h ,
where rg
t,hdenotes the annualized net returns on gross assets and rl
t,hthe an-
nualized net return on gross liabilities at horizon h, while det,h/et,h is the an-
nualized rate of depreciation between t and t   h. These regressions use








30 Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Hélène Rey1.3, for horizons between one and ﬁve years, with standard errors in paren-
theses.
We ﬁnd that depreciations are associated with signiﬁcantly larger re-
turns on gross assets and (marginally signiﬁcantly) lower returns on gross
liabilities. This indicates potentially powerful valuation eﬀects.
Given these (admittedly) reduced-form relations, we can now estimate
the magnitude of the depreciation needed for the United States to satisfy
the steady state relation linking its net foreign asset position to its net ex-
ports within an horizon of h years. To do so, we start by w riting the accu-
mulation equation (2) between t and t   h:
nfat h   
h





i j  
Assuming that we reach the steady state in t   h, so that nfat h   nfa and
nxt h   nx, and assuming that the growth rate of the economy is constant
along this transition and equal to g, we obtain15
(5) nfa ≈ g h  r  
a
h    h
ah  at   r  
l
h    l
hh  lt 






The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side reﬂects the impact of the change in
the exchange rate on the net foreign asset position (the valuation eﬀect).
The second term represents the cumulated impact of the depreciation on
the trade balance (the trade balance eﬀect).
Finally, we observe that in the steady state, nfa   nx/(1 – R/g)   [nxt  
h de/e]/(1 – R/g). Putting everything together, we can solve for the annual
depreciation rate that restores the long-run external balance in h years:
     g hh( h
aat    l






  g h(r  
a
hat   r  
l
hlt)   nxt  
The required rate of depreciation depends upon the horizon h, the trade
elasticity  , the semielasticity of returns to the exchange rate ( h
a and  l
h) as
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15. This assumes that the growth rate of the U.S. economy is unaﬀected by the change in the
exchange rate. Obviously, this is a strong assumption.1.5.2 Numerical Application
We use data from 2004 for the net foreign asset to GDP ratio (nat   –26
percent), the net export to GDP ratio (nxt   –4.8 percent), the ratio of
gross assets over GDP (at   76 percent), and the ratio of gross liabilities
over GDP (lt   103 percent). Returns and elasticity of returns to exchange
rate changes are taken from table 1.3 for the relevant horizon.
Table 1.4 reveals that a return to equilibrium in one year would require
an implausible depreciation of 75 percent. Such a large depreciation would
turn around the trade balance from –4.8 percent to 0.18 percent. However,
the main direct eﬀect of the depreciation would be to wipe out most of the
net foreign liabilities of the United States. The long-run net foreign assets
would stabilize around –3.3 percent. Of course, it is rather implausible that
the asset composition of international portfolios would remain constant in
the face of such a major change in relative prices.
Going back to the long-run equilibrium in three years instead would re-
quire a depreciation of 26 percent per year, while a return to equilibrium in
ﬁve years would require a depreciation of 18 percent per year. An extended
adjustment period implies that the United States would be running current
account deﬁcits—and accumulate foreign debt—for a longer time. This
has two implications. First, the long-run value of the net foreign debt re-
mains quite substantial. In fact, we ﬁnd that if the adjustment takes ﬁve
years, the net foreign debt will still represent 22 percent of GDP, only
slightly down from its current value of 26 percent. Second, this requires a
more substantial turnaround in net exports. We ﬁnd that the trade balance
would have to reach a surplus of 0.46 percent each year at a three-year
horizon, or 1.15 percent at ﬁve years.
A higher elasticity of exports allows for a smaller depreciation of the ex-
change rate. When   1/10, the depreciation at one year is only 53 percent
and drops to 13 percent per year for a ﬁve-year adjustment. The equilib-
32 Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Hélène Rey
Table 1.4 Depreciations required to go to the long-run equilibrium 
Horizon h (years)  
Annual depreciation to: 1 3 5
  1/15
Required depreciation (%) 74.6 26.3 17.8
Long-run trade balance (% of GDP) 0.18 0.46 1.15
Long-run net foreign asset position (% of GDP) –3.3 –8.7 –21.9
  1/10
Required depreciation (%) 52.9 18.7 12.6
Long-run trade balance (% of GDP) 0.49 0.82 1.48
Long-run net foreign asset position (% of GDP) –9.3 –15.6 –28.1rium trade balance exhibits a larger surplus, and the net foreign asset debt
remains comparably larger (28 percent at ﬁve years).
Our exercise is very diﬀerent from Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (chap. 9 in this
volume). They look at the eﬀect of an unexpected drought of capital ﬂows
on the exchange rate (unanticipated forced adjustment). Unlike them, we
study the eﬀect of expected exchange rate changes on the adjustment pro-
cess.
There is, of course, no theoretical reason to assume that the U.S. net for-
eign asset position should go back to its long-run equilibrium in one or
three or ﬁve years. In Gourinchas and Rey (2005), we base our forecasts of
exchange rate depreciation on historical adjustment speeds and predict
smaller rates of depreciation. But the type of exercise that we have under-
taken here could be seen as estimating the necessary exchange rate depre-
ciation in the event of exogenous shocks on capital ﬂows that could force
the U.S. net foreign asset position to adjust suddenly.16
1.6 Concluding Remarks: Current Issues in 
Light of the Bretton Woods Debates
The main objective of this paper is to bring new data to bear on the ques-
tion of the external adjustment process of the United States. We con-
structed a quarterly data set of U.S. external assets and liabilities at market
value going back to 1952. We showed that the United States has always
faced a weakened external constraint. In particular, it has consistently
been able to borrow on quite favorable terms and earn a signiﬁcant pre-
mium on its provision of global liquidity. Perhaps surprisingly, this ability
has strengthened over time, despite the runs on the dollar of the 1970s and
the demise of the ﬁxed exchange rate system.
In this context, we ﬁnd it instructive to revisit the intellectual debates of
the 1960s regarding the U.S. balance-of-payments problem. We are cer-
tainly not the ﬁrst ones to point out interesting parallels between the chal-
lenges of the Bretton Woods system and the current global imbalances (see
Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber 2003; Eichengreen 2004). Our con-
tribution is merely to point out what our revised estimates of the U.S. ex-
ternal positions have to say about both historical and current debates.
Broadly speaking, we identify three strands of analysis of the current sit-
uation with their parallels in the 1960s. The ﬁrst strand puts the blame
squarely on the subordination of U.S. economic policies to domestic objec-
tives, at the expense of external adjustment. In the 1960s, many argued, the
United States was unwilling to pursue the tight monetary policy that would
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16. We also note that our analysis does not allow us to infer anything regarding the eﬀect
of a (possibly large) dollar depreciation on aggregate income. In that respect our analysis is
very complementary to Adalet and Eichengreen (chap. 6 in this volume) and to Freund and
Warnock (chap. 4 in this volume).have been required to prevent the drain on gold reserves. Instead, the United
States adopted indirect policy initiatives (interest equalization tax, oﬀset
agreements, import surcharge) that were designed speciﬁcally to free mone-
tary policy from its external constraint. In the current context, this line of
thought emphasizes the impact of the recent string of ﬁscal deﬁcits (Bush tax
cuts, military expenditures) on national savings (Roubini and Setser 2004).
Seen in the broader perspective that our data analysis allows, it is not
clear that this can be the whole story. Since 1973, and the decoupling of the
U.S. dollar from gold, the dollar exchange rates have been largely free to
adjust and restore external stability—if need be—through the usual chan-
nels of adjustment. Yet what do we observe since 1973? First, a stabiliza-
tion, even an improvement between 1975 and 1980, where the ratio of net
assets to GDP climbs back to its 1960s level (10 percent). But this is fol-
lowed by an unprecedented slide between 1980 and 2004, from 10 percent
to –26 percent of GDP. Looking at the ﬁgure, the Bretton Woods era looks
like a period of relatively modest balance of payments imbalances.17 While
domestic ﬁscal and monetary developments certainly play a role, we are
struck by the secular decline in net foreign assets across the Reagan com-
bination of ﬁscal deﬁcits and tight money and the Clinton era of ﬁscal rec-
titude and surging asset prices to the current descent into ﬁscal deﬁcits and
lax monetary policy.
A second line of thought emphasized the unique role of the United
States as the provider of the main international currency and liquidity. In
1966, Despres, Kindleberger, and Salant argued that the United States was
the world banker. It provided safe low-yield assets to world savers with a
preference for liquidity. In exchange, U.S. investors, with a lower taste for
liquidity, saw investment opportunities in the rest of the world in the form
of long-term loans. This line of thought has two modern incarnations. The
ﬁrst variation puts the emphasis on the central banks of developing coun-
tries and their incentive to subsidize U.S. consumption by accumulating
U.S. treasury bills (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber 2003). The sec-
ond variation is very much in the spirit of the original Despres, Kindle-
berger, and Salant (1966) analysis. It sees the United States as a provider of
safe ﬁnancial assets to the rest of the world (Bernanke 2005; Cooper 2004).
Following the Asian and Russian crisis, the high savings from emerging
economies looked for a safe and liquid haven. The U.S. assets, especially
treasuries, provided the perfect vehicle. As we show, there is substantial ev-
idence that the United States does indeed perform the functions of a liq-
uidity provider. This is perhaps even more the case since the liberalization
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17. This is in part due to the fact that the external constraint manifested itself on a small
subset of the overall external balance sheet of the United States, the Oﬃcial Settlement Bal-
ance. The United States experienced a gold drain even though it was running small current
account surpluses over that period. But the larger point that the overall external portfolio of
the United States did not deteriorate much over that period is still valid.of ﬁnancial markets that allow equity and direct investment in emerging
economies. From world banker, the United States has become, for all in-
tents and purposes, the world venture capitalist!
Yet that analysis does not imply that the current situation can be main-
tained indeﬁnitely. In fact, our analysis of the tipping point indicates that
while the United States is still some ways away from making net payments
on its mounting stock of net liabilities, that moment is approaching. For-
eign lenders could decide to stop ﬁnancing the U.S. external deﬁcit and run
away from the dollar, either in favor of another currency such as the euro
or, just as dramatically, requiring a risk premium on U.S. liquid assets
whose safety could not be guaranteed any longer.18In either case, the reper-
cussions could be quite severe, with a decline in the value of the dollar,
higher domestic interest rates and yields, and a global recession.
The previous discussion points to a possible instability, even in an inter-
national monetary system that lacks a formal anchor. The relevant reference
here is Triﬃn’s prescient work on the fundamental instability of the Bretton
Woods system (see Triﬃn 1960). Triﬃn saw that in a world where the ﬂuctu-
ations in gold supply were dictated by the vagaries of discoveries in South
Africa or the destabilizing schemes of Soviet Russia, but in any case unable
to grow with world demand for liquidity, the demand for the dollar was
bound to eventually exceed the gold reserves of the Federal Reserve. This left
the door open for a run on the dollar. Interestingly, the current situation can
be seen in a similar light: in a world where the United States can supply the
international currency at will and invests it in illiquid assets, it still faces a
conﬁdence risk. There could be a run on the dollar not because investors
would fear an abandonment of the gold parity, as in the 1970s, but because
they would fear a plunge in the dollar exchange rate. In other words, Triﬃn’s
analysis does not have to rely on the gold-dollar parity to be relevant. Gold
or not, the specter of the Triﬃn dilemma may still be haunting us!
Appendix A
Detailed Description of the Construction of the International
Investment Position for the United States
Overview of Data Issues and Methodology
In order to evaluate the extent and the nature of U.S. external imbal-
ances, one needs an accurate measure of the IIP of the United States. A ma-
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18. For a study of the likelihood of the euro replacing the dollar as the main reserve cur-
rency, see Chinn and Frankel (chap. 8 in this volume).jor drawback of the oﬃcial balance of payments statistics is the absence of
valuation in the current account measures. This implies that if one were to
simply cumulate the current account to compute the net foreign asset po-
sition of the United States, one would get a biased estimate.
Data on the net and gross foreign asset position of the United States is
available from two sources: the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Federal Reserve Flows of Funds ac-
counts (FFA) for the rest of the world. The BEA reports annually its Inter-
national Investment Position of the United States. The IIP details gross and
net foreign asset positions at the end of the year since 1976. In addition, the
BEA reports quarterly ﬂow data in the U.S. International Transactions
(USIT) tables since 1960 for some ﬂow series, 1982 for others.19 The BEA
data uses balance-of-payment concepts, in accordance with the IMF’s Bal-
ance of Payments Manual (1993). Following oﬃcial classiﬁcations, we split
U.S. net foreign portfolio into four categories: Debt (corporate and gov-
ernment bonds), Equity, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and Other. The
other category includes mostly bank loans and trade credits. The BEA data
provide equity and FDI (since 1980) ﬁgures at market value and perform
an exchange rate adjustment for debt. The quality of the data is good.20
For its part, the Federal Reserve publishes since 1952 the quarterly ﬂows
and positions for the “rest of the world” account, as part of its Flow of
Funds accounts. While covering a longer sample, the FFA data presents
two drawbacks. First, equity positions are the only series recorded at mar-
ket value. Debt, FDI, and Other claims and liabilities are recorded at his-
torical costs. Second, the FFA data is of poorer quality and uses National
Income and Product Account (NIPA) concepts that diﬀer subtly from their
BOP equivalent. But the primary source data are often similar, except for
a few items:21 (a) the treatment of international banking facilities (IBF)
and (b) the treatment of the Netherlands Antilles Aﬃliates. An IBF is a set
of books maintained by a U.S. bank that are not subject to domestic bank-
ing regulations. They allow U.S. banks to oﬀer oﬀshore banking services
onshore. The BEA considers that IBF are inside the United States, while
the FFA consider that they are foreign residents. As to the second point,
the BEA treats all transactions between parents and aﬃliates as part of di-
rect investment. Instead, the FFA treats these ﬂows as part of corporate
debt liabilities.
Our approach was to supplement the BEA’s IIP data for all categories of
assets and liabilities, and each point in time back to 1952, using Survey of
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19. For instance, equity and debt ﬂows are available separately after 1982 only.
20. Technically, the BEA provides data on FDI at market value since 1982. However, the
IMF constructed market value positions for 1980 and 1981. We use these estimates in our
analysis. The Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) data set includes annual data since 1973 and co-
incides with the BEA data after 1980.
21. See Hooker and Wilson (1989) for a detailed comparison.Current Business reported holdings for Equity and Debt, BEA, and FFA
ﬂow data, U.S. Treasury benchmark surveys on holdings, and by con-
structing valuation adjustments for each subcategory of assets and liabili-
ties. In this appendix, we describe in detail our methodology for con-
structing the gross asset and liability positions of the United States on a
quarterly basis since 1952. In particular, we provide a reconciliation of the
data treatment of the Flow of Funds and the BEA.
Denote PXt the end-of-period t position for some asset category X. We
use the following updating equation:
(A1) PXt   PXt 1   FXt   DXt,
where FXt denotes the ﬂows corresponding to asset X that enters the bal-
ance of payments, and DXt denotes a discrepancy reﬂecting a market valu-
ation adjustment between periods t – 1 and t. When we cannot measure
DXtdirectly, we construct an estimate as rt
xPXt–1, where rt
xrepresents the es-
timated dollar capital gain on category Xbetween time t– 1 and time t. Our
approach, therefore, requires that we specify market returns rt
x for each
subcategory of the ﬁnancial account.
Data in the ﬁnal quarter of each year are mapped to the IIP data of the
BEA, when available.22 Therefore, the valuation term between the third
and fourth quarters includes all adjustments not captured by our valuation
method, such as change in the coverage of the series.
Reconciliation of the Flow of Funds and the BEA Data
Mapping the Flows
The material in this section draws heavily from Hooker and Wilson
(1989). It is important to understand why and how the FFA and BEA data
diﬀer. First and foremost, one should realize that the BEA and FFA data
are essentially compiled from the same source data. The main diﬀerences
lie in the deﬁnition of the various concepts (NIPA vs. BOP), their geo-
graphical coverage, and the treatment of valuation eﬀects. This appendix
clariﬁes the points relevant to our analysis.
To establish a correspondence between FFA and BEA, we start from the
balance-of-payment’s identity:
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22. The only exception is for direct investment. The reason is that when we extend the val-
uation adjustment used by the BEA before 1980, we end up with negative gross positions be-
fore 1970. This could come from an imperfect accounting of reinvested earnings. According
to the BOP manual, direct investment income in the current account includes distributed
earnings as well as the share of reinvested earnings with an oﬀsetting entry in the ﬁnancial ac-
count. This implies that reinvested earnings are included in the ﬂow FXt and should be ex-
cluded from the return rt
x in equation (A1). We adjusted the valuation terms to replicate the
BEA’s annual adjustment from 1982 onward but chose to start both FDI gross asset and lia-
bilities position at 0 at the beginning of our sample and update (A1) forward.(A2) CA   KA   FA   SD   0,
where CA denotes the U.S. current account (USIT table 1, line 76), KA the
U.S. capital account (table 1, line 39), FA denotes the ﬁnancial account
(table 1, lines 40 and 55) and SD the statistical discrepancy (errors and
omissions, table 1, line 70).23
The equivalent accounting identity in the FFA takes the following
form.24
(A3) CA  KA  FA  SD  0,
where CA  denotes the NIPA’s current account (FFA table F107, line 5 mi-
nus line 1), KA  is the (NIPA) net capital transfers (table F107, line 8 with
sign reversed), FA denotes NIPA’s net ﬁnancial investment (table F107, line
12), and SD  denotes the (NIPA) statistical discrepancy (table F107, line
55). KA  is equal to KA, so that we can combine (A2) and (A3) to obtain:
(A4) SD  (CA   CA )   (FA   FA )   SD
The NIPA statistical discrepancy SD  is equal to the BOP statistical dis-
crepancy SD plus an adjustment for the diﬀerence in the deﬁnitions of the
current and ﬁnancial accounts in the NIPA and BOP, respectively.
Next, we decompose the ﬁnancial accounts FA  and FA as follows:
FA  FA  f   FA  us
FA   FA f   FA us,
where FA  f (respectively, FAf) represents the change in foreign-owned U.S.
assets (gross liabilities) in the FFA (respectively, the BOP), and FA  us (re-
spectively, FAus) represents the change in U.S.-owned assets abroad (gross
assets) in the FFA (respectively, the BOP).25 The Guide to the Flows of
Funds Accounts (Federal Reserve Board 2000, 370–80) establishes the fol-
lowing correspondence between FA  f and FAf:
(A5) FA  f   FA f   Gold and special drawing rights (SDR); (Table F107
line 14)
  net issuance of bonds by Netherland Antillean
subsidiaries (table F107, line 27b)
  change in interbank claims on foreigners (table F107,
lines 15f to 15l)
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23. All line references in USIT table 1 and FFA table F107 are accurate as of January 2005.
24. Note that we write this equation from the point of view of the United States, while the
FFA is from the perspective of the rest of the world. So CA  is the opposite of the current ac-
count recorded in the FFA.
25. This is with the BOP convention that FAus   0 when there is a gross capital outﬂow.Accordingly, gross external liabilities according to the BEA and the FFA
exhibit three diﬀerences:
1. The FFA treats transactions involving Gold and SDR as changes in
foreign assets, while the BEA treats them as changes in U.S. assets. In the
FFA, Gold and SDR (table F107, line 14) corresponds to sales of Gold and
SDR by the United States (USIT table 1, lines 42 and 43), with the sign re-
versed.
2. In the late 1970s and 1980s, some U.S. corporations established ﬁ-
nancial subsidiaries in the Netherland Antilles to tap international capi-
tal markets and avoid capital control and tax laws. The subsidiary would
issue eurobonds and channel the funds back to the U.S. parent company.
The balance of payments considers all transactions between parent and
aﬃliates as part of direct investment and subtracts issuance of eurobonds
by foreign ﬁnancial subsidiaries from direct investment outﬂows. By con-
trast, the FFA treats these capital ﬂows as direct bond issuance by the U.S.
parent companies, adds them to bond liabilities, and adds them back to
foreign direct investment outﬂows.26 The removal of the withholding tax
in 1984 eliminated the incentive to use overseas subsidiaries to issue
eurobonds. The FFA practice was discontinued in the fourth quarter of
1992.
3. The FFA nets interbank claims, while the BEA reports claims on a
gross basis.27 In order to map back the FFA to the BEA, we need to sub-
tract the “changes in net interbank claims on foreigners” (lines 15f to 15l).
Further, FA  us must satisfy the key identity (A3), given SD :
(A6) FA  us   FA  f   CA  KA  SD 
The last piece of the puzzle is the deﬁnition of SD  in the FFA given by
(A7) SD (F107, line 55)    CA  KA  (F107, line 8 with minus sign)
  SD (F107, line 55a)
  CA (F107, line 55b with opposite sign).
Combining with equation (A4), we obtain
FA  FA   KA.
In words, the FFA net investment position includes the BEA capital trans-
fers.
Combining (A7) and (A6), we extract FA  us as
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26. This assumes that the bond issue is purchased entirely by the rest of the world.
27. Net interbank claims (F107, line 15)   interbank liabilities (F107, lines 15a to e) – in-
terbank claims (F107, lines 15f to l). An additional distinction comes from the treatment of
international banking facilities, counted as domestic entities in the BOP and foreign entities
in the FFA. We lump this term with the change in interbank claims on foreigners.FA  us    FA us   KA
  Gold and SDR (F107, line 14)
  net issuance of bonds by Netherland Antilles subsidiaries
(F107, line 27b)
  change in interbank claims on foreigners (F107, lines 15f
to 15l).
To summarize, the asset ﬂow side has the same adjustments as the ﬂow li-
ability side, plus the subtraction of the capital account transactions.
In order to construct a measure of the U.S. international investment po-
sition comparable with existing measures, we adopt the BEA’s classiﬁca-
tion. Accordingly, we adopt the following decomposition for gross assets
and liabilities:
FAf   FEL   FDL   FFL   FOL
with
FA f   Foreign-owned assets in the United States (table 1, line 55)
FEL   Equity (table 7a, line B4 and memo line 4)
FDL   Debt (table 7a, line 16, 30, and memo line 3)
FFL   Direct investment (table 1, line 64)
and
 FAus   FEA   FDA   FFA   FOA
with
FAus   U.S.-owned assets abroad (table 1, line 40)
FEA   Equity (table 7a, line A4)
FDA   Debt (table 7a, line 18)
FFA   Direct investment (table 1, line 51).
We have similar deﬁnitions for the FFA based gross ﬂows:
FA  f   FEL  FDL  FFL  FOL 
with
FA  f   Net acquisition of ﬁnancial assets (table F107, line 13)
FEL  Equity (table F107, line 29)
FDL  Debt (table F107, line 21, 24, and 27)
FFL  Direct investment (table F107, line 33)
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FA  us   FEA  FDA  FFA  FOA 
with
FA  us   Net increase in liabilities of the rest of the world (table 107, line 35)
FEA  Equity (table 107, line 47)
FDA  Debt (table 107, line 40)
FFA  Direct investment (table 107, line 53).
According to the Guide to the Flow of Funds (Federal Reserve Board
2000), the FFA and BOP series satisfy
FDL  FDL  net issuance of bonds by Netherland Antilles 





FFA  FFA net issuance of bonds by Netherland Antilles
subsidiaries (F107, line 27b)
from which we conclude that
FOL  FOL   Gold and SDR (F107, line 14)
 change in interbank claims on foreigners (F107, lines 15f to 15l)
FOA  FOA   KA
  Gold and SDR (F107, line 14)
 change in interbank claims on foreigners (F107, lines 15f to 15l).
Appendix B presents a line-by-line description of the mapping.
The Dynamics of the External Budget Constraint
The stock data in the BEA is updated as follows:
(A8) PX i
t 1   PXi
t   FX i
t 1   DX i
t 1,
where PX i
trepresents the position at the end of period tfor series i, FX i
tthe
ﬂow during period (BEA deﬁnition) t, and DX i
t a discontinuity reﬂecting a
market valuation adjustment or a change of coverage in the series between
t – 1 and t. Summing across all the series, we obtain the international in-
vestment position at the end of period t   1:
From World Banker to World Venture Capitalist 41NFAt 1  ∑
j
PA j







t   FA j
t 1   DA j
t 1)  ∑
i
(PLi
t   FLi
t 1   DLi
t 1)
  NFAt   ∑
j
FA j
t 1  ∑
i
FLi
t 1    ∑
j
DA j




In turn, the ﬂow data satisﬁes







  CAt   SDt   KAt,
where we used the fundamental BOP equation. Substituting,









is the net discrepancy. In the case where there is no change in coverage of
the data, this net discrepancy corresponds to the capital gains. Further, we
can write the current account as follows:
CAt   NXt   It   UTt,
where Itdenotes net income receipts (including interest income, distributed
dividends, and FDI earnings), and UTt represents unilateral transfers plus
net compensation of employees.28The sum of It 1and NDt 1represents the
total return on the net foreign asset portfolio between t and t   1, (Rt 1 –
1)NFAt. We can then rewrite the accumulation equation as
NFAt 1   Rt 1NFAt   NXt 1   UTt 1   KAt 1   SDt 1.
Appendix B
Line-by-Line Description, Flows, Positions, and Return Data
The remainder of this appendix presents a line-by-line account of the con-
struction of the U.S. international investment position of the United
States, from 1952:1 to 2004:1.
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28. According to the BOP manual, direct investment income in the CA includes distributed
earnings as well as the share of reinvested earnings. So there is an entry in the current account
and an oﬀsetting entry in the ﬁnancial account.The following is a list of acronyms:
BEA Bureau of Economic Analysis (Department of Commerce)
FFA Flow of Funds (Federal Reserve)
USIT U.S. International Transactions, BEA, BOP concepts
IIP U.S. International Investment Position, BEA, BOP concepts




• After the ﬁrst quarter of 1982, data are from BEA (USIT table 7b, line
A2 before the ﬁrst quarter of 1998, then USIT table 7a, line A4).
• Before 1982, data are from FFA table F107, line 47 (FU263164003.Q,
foreign corporate equities, including American deposit receipts
[ADRs] and not seasonally adjusted [NSA]). Before the ﬁrst quarter of
1974, the FFA series reports incorrectly the sum of equity and debt
holdings by U.S. residents (also reported in USIT table 1, line 52). The
ﬂow series is corrected by subtracting FFA table F107, line 40
(FU263163003.Q, bonds, NSA). This error is corrected in the FFA
data published after June 2004.
Levels
End-of-year positions are from BEA.
• After 1976, data are from BEA IIP table 2, line 21 (corporate stocks,
including results from the U.S. Treasury’s 1994 and 1997 Benchmark
Surveys of U.S. Ownership of Foreign Long-Term Securities).
• Before 1976, data are from SCB, various lines.
Valuation Adjustment
Quarterly equity portfolio dollar capital gains are constructed using the
U.S. Treasury 1997 Benchmark Surveys of U.S. Ownership of Foreign Long-




• After the ﬁrst quarter of 1982, data are from BEA (USIT table 7b, line
A13 before the ﬁrst quarter of 1998, then USIT table 7a, line A18).
• Before 1982, data are from FFA table F107, line 40 (FU263163003.Q,
bonds, NSA).
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End-of-year positions are from BEA.
• After 1976, positions are from BEA IIP table 2, line 20 (bonds, in-
cluding results from the U.S. Treasury’s 1994 and 1997 Benchmark
Surveys of U.S. Ownership of Foreign Long-Term Securities).
• Before 1976, positions are available from SCB.
Valuation Adjustment
Maturity weights are 25 percent for short term and 75 percent for long
term. There is no valuation adjustment for short term. For long-term
bonds, this is the weighted average dollar holding period excess return




• After the ﬁrst quarter of 1960, data are from BEA (USIT table 1, line
51).
• Before the ﬁrst quarter of 1960, data are from FFA table F107, line 53
(FU263192005.Q, U.S. direct investment abroad). Note that through
the fourth quarter of 1992, FFA U.S. direct investment abroad ex-
cludes net inﬂows from corporate bonds issued by Netherlands Antil-
lean ﬁnancial subsidiaries. There is no discrepancy here as these bonds
issues start after 1978.
Levels
Start positions are at zero in the ﬁrst quarter of 1952 and cumulate for-
ward. Note that we do not benchmark the data to the BEA IIP series (table
2, line 18) available after 1982 at market value. The reason is that applying
the BEA valuation adjustment backwards from the fourth quarter of 1982
results in negative gross FDI asset position before 1973. Our estimated po-
sition for the fourth quarter of 1982 is $267 billion. The BEA reports $227
billion.
Valuation Adjustment
Quarterly direct investment portfolio capital gains are constructed using
rolling weights (series RFDR$). The weights are constructed using BEA
direct investment positions by country (historical cost basis) from 1966 un-
til 2002. The ﬁnal shares cover 75 percent of direct investment assets in
each year. The implicit annual return in the BEA positions is regressed on
this capital gain series between 1982 and 2003. The regression coeﬃcient
44 Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Hélène Rey(0.754367) is used to scale down the capital gain series. It is smaller than 1,
as expected. The reason is that the BEA records reinvested earnings as in-
ﬂows. But reinvested earnings are also part of the capital gain series. With-
out adjustment, we would be double counting the reinvested earnings.
Other Assets
Flows
• Before the ﬁrst quarter of 1960, other asset ﬂows are constructed to
match the BEA deﬁnition. We start with other asset ﬂows deﬁned from
FFA: FFA total assets (table F107, line 35, FU264190005.Q, net in-
crease in U.S. liabilities of the rest of the world) minus FFA bonds
(F107, line 40, FU263163003.Q, change in bond liabilities of the rest
of the world to U.S. residents) minus FFA equity (F107, line 47,
FU263164003.Q, net purchase of foreign corporate equities by U.S.
residents [corrected, see the description of equity asset ﬂows]) minus
FFA direct investment (F107, line 53, FU263192005.Q, U.S. direct in-
vestment abroad, excluding bonds sold by Netherlands Antillean ﬁ-
nancial subsidiaries). Then we adjust the ﬂows to map into the BEA
deﬁnitions: other assets from FFA plus capital account (USIT table 1,
line 39) plus change in interbank claims.
• After the ﬁrst quarter of 1960, it is deﬁned as residual from total BEA
asset ﬂows: total assets (USIT table 1, line 40, U.S. owned assets
abroad) minus equity, debt, and direct investment ﬂows.
Levels
After 1976, end of year positions are from BEA IIP table 2, line 5 (U.S.
oﬃcial reserve assets) plus line 10 (U.S. government assets, other than oﬃ-
cial reserve assets) plus line 22 (U.S. claims on unaﬃliated foreigners re-
ported by U.S. nonbanking concerns) and line 23 (U.S. claims reported by







• After the ﬁrst quarter of 1973, data are from sum of BEA equity (SCB
before the ﬁrst quarter of 1982, USIT table 7b, line B2 between the ﬁrst
quarter of 1982 and the ﬁrst quarter of 1998, then table 7a, line B4 af-
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1982, USIT table 7b, line memo 4 between the ﬁrst quarter of 1982 and
the ﬁrst quarter of 1998 and table 7a, line memo 4 after).
• Before 1973, FFA equity data are from table F107, line 29
(FU263064003.Q, net purchases of U.S. corporate equity by the rest
of the world). The FFA data includes equity purchased by foreign
oﬃcial agencies (reported separately by the BEA).
Levels
End-of-year positions are from BEA.
• After 1980, positions are from IMF IIP (B8660@C111). The IMF
data includes equity holdings by foreign oﬃcial agencies.
• Between 1976 and 1980, comparison of the BEA IIP table 40 (corpo-
rate stocks) show that foreign oﬃcial holdings are zero.
• Before 1976, positions are available from the Survey of Current Busi-
ness.
Valuation
Quarterly equity portfolio capital gains (series EQRUS) are from S&P
500 (see detailed descriptions for returns in returns section).
Debt
Flows
• After the ﬁrst quarter of 1982, data are from BEA ﬂows: sum of private
foreign holdings of U.S. corporate and federally sponsored agency
bonds (USIT table 7b, line 10 before 1998, then table 7a, lines 16 and
30) and foreign oﬃcial holdings of U.S. government securities (USIT
table 1, line 57) and foreign private holdings of U.S. Treasury securi-
ties (USIT table 1, line 65) and corporate and agency bonds held by
foreign oﬃcial agencies (USIT table 7b, line memo 3 before 1998, then
table 7a, memo 3).
• Before 1982, data are from FFA U.S. treasury securities (table F107,
line 21, FU263061105.Q, treasury securities) plus U.S. agency and
GSE-backed securities (table F107, line 24, FU263061705) plus U.S.
corporate bonds (table F107, line 27, FU263063005.Q, includes net
issues by Netherland Antillean ﬁnancial subsidiaries of U.S. corpor-
ations) minus estimate of net issues of corporate bonds from Nether-
land Antillean ﬁnancial subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. Each FFA
series is constructed or corrected as follows:
—FFA table F107, line 22 (FU263061113.Q, foreign oﬃcial holdings
of Treasury securities), a subcategory of F107, line 21, is incorrect
before the fourth quarter of 1981. The series is remapped to BEA
table 1, line 58 (foreign oﬃcial holdings of U.S. Treasury securities).
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ter of 1977 for discontinuity in the coverage of the series (see section
appendix C for a methodological description on how we treat dis-
continuities in coverage).
—Net issues of corporate bonds from Netherland Antillean ﬁnancial
subsidiaries are estimated as the diﬀerence between minus FFA-
based direct investment assets (table F107, line 53, FU263192005.Q,
U.S. direct investment abroad) and BEA-based direct investment as-
sets (USIT table 1, line 51). They are set to zero before the ﬁrst quar-
ter of 1979.
Levels
• After 1982, end-of-year positions are from IMF IIP (B8669@C111).
The IMF data includes foreign oﬃcial agencies holdings of corporate
bonds (reported separately in BEA IIP).
• Between 1976 and 1981, data are from BEA IIP table 2, line 27 (for-
eign oﬃcial holdings of U.S. government securities) plus line 37 (for-
eign private holdings of U.S. Treasuries) plus line 39 (foreign private
holdings of corporate and other bonds) plus line 32 (foreign oﬃcial
holdings of other assets).
• Between 1971 and 1976, the same positions are available from the Sur-
vey of Current Business. No data are available before 1971.
Valuation
We assume a maturity structure of 25 percent for short term (no valua-
tion) and 75 percent for long term. For the long-term valuation, we use the
quarterly holding excess return over yields on ten-year U.S. government
debt (series RN@C111); see the returns section.
Direct Investment
Flows
• After the fourth quarter of 1976, data are from BEA direct investment
(USIT table 1, line 64). The FFA series (table F107, line 33,
FU263092001.Q, foreign direct investment in the U.S.) is identical to
the BEA series after 1960.
• Before the fourth quarter of 1976, data are from FFA series (table
F107, line 33, FU263092001.Q, foreign direct investment in the U.S.),
adjusted upwards for the discontinuity in coverage in the fourth quar-
ter of 1976 (see appendix C for a methodological description on how
we treat discontinuities in coverage).
Levels
Start positions are at zero in the ﬁrst quarter of 1952 and cumulate for-
ward. Note that we do not benchmark the data to the BEA IIP series (table
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the BEA valuation adjustment backwards from the fourth quarter of 1982
results in negative gross FDI liability position before 1973. Our estimated
position for the fourth quarter of 1982 is $144 billion. The BEA reports
$130 billion.
Valuation
Quarterly direct investment portfolio capital gains are constructed using
S&P 500 capital gains series (EQRUS). The implicit annual return in the
BEA positions from 1982 to 2003 is regressed on this capital gain series.
The regression coeﬃcient (0.681023) is used to scale down the capital gain
series. It is smaller than 1 as expected. The reason is that the BEA records
reinvested earnings as inﬂows. But reinvested earnings are also part of the




• After the fourth quarter of 1976, they are deﬁned as residual from to-
tal BEA liabilities: total liabilities (USIT table 1, line 55) minus debt,
equity and direct investment liability ﬂows.
• Between the ﬁrst quarter of 1960 and the third quarter of 1976, they
are deﬁned as residualfrom total BEA liabilities: total liabilities (USIT
table 1, line 55) minus debt, equity and direct investment liability ﬂows
measured as USIT table 1, line 64. (Note that the direct investment
ﬂows are not adjusted upward for the discontinuity. Hence, we are as-
suming that total liabilities are mismeasured before the fourth quarter
of 1976.)
• Before the ﬁrst quarter of 1960, data are constructed from FFA to
match the BEA deﬁnition (see A2). Start with other liabilities FFA
ﬂows deﬁned as FFA total liabilities (table F107, line 13,
FU264090005.Q, net acquisition of ﬁnancial assets by the rest of the
world) minus FFA bonds (F107, line 21 FU263061105, Treasury se-
curities, F107, line 24, FU263061705, agency and GSE-backed securi-
ties, F107, line 27, FU263063005, U.S. corporate bonds, all series cor-
rected as described previously), minus FFA equity (F107, line 29,
FU263064003.Q) minus FFA direct investment (F107, line 33,
FU263092001.Q). Then adjust FFA series to map into the BEA deﬁ-
nition: other liability (FFA) minus FFA Gold and SDR (F107, line 14,
FU263011005.Q, net purchases of Gold and SDR from the United
States by the rest of the world) plus change in interbank claims (equal
to zero before 1960).
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After 1976, end-of-year positions are from BEA IIP table 2, line 30 (other
U.S. government liabilities) and line 31 (U.S. liabilities reported by U.S.
banks, not included elsewhere) and line 41 (U.S. currency) and line 42 (U.S.
liabilities to unaﬃliated foreigners reported by U.S. nonbanking concerns)




Most ﬁnancial and exchange rate data are obtained from the Global Fi-
nancial Database (GFD) and International Financial Statistics (IFS).
Assets
Equity
Total Return (EQTR97$). Equity total return is for the rest of the world.
The country weights are constructed from table 1 of The U.S. Treasury’s
(2000) report on U.S. holdings of foreign long-term securities. The country
weights represent 75 percent of total foreign equity holdings by U.S. in-
vestors. For each country, a series for dollar quarterly total stock return is
constructed. The local currency returns are converted into dollars using
end-of-period nominal exchange rates against the dollar compiled from
IFS after 1957 and from GFD before. Before 1987, total returns series for
Mexico, Brazil, and Switzerland (before 1966) are unavailable. The weights
are adjusted appropriately. Table 1B.1 reports the weights by subperiod
and the total return series for each country.
Capital Gain(EQR97$).The equity capital gain series uses the same coun-
try weights as table 1B.1. For each country, a series for dollar quarterly cap-
ital gain return is constructed. Local capital gain returns from GFD are
converted into dollars using end-of-period nominal exchange rates. Coun-
try weights are reported in table 1B.2.
Debt
Total Return.Weighted average of the total return on long-term bonds and
total return on short-term bonds. Maturity composition is 75 percent for
long term and 25 percent for short term, from table 2 in the U.S. Treasury’s
(2003) report on U.S. holdings of foreign securities.
• Long term (R$@RW): This is the weighted average dollar holding
period return on foreign long-term bonds. The currency weights are
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ings of foreign long-term securities for the year 1994. Given the avail-
ability of country bond yield data, we cover about 80 percent of the
long-term debt positions. The currency weights are reported in table
1B.3. Total quarterly holding period returns are calculated from the
changes in yields (assuming that the yield equals the coupon and using
the formula (10.1.19) in Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997, 408)
converted into U.S. dollars using end-of-period nominal exchange
rates compiled from IFS after 1957 and GFD before.
• Short term (RSRW$): This is the weighted average dollar holding pe-
riod return on foreign short term bonds. The currency weights are
taken from table 14 of the U.S. Treasury’s (2003) report on U.S. hold-
ings of foreign securities for 2001. With the short-term returns avail-
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Table 1B.1 Country-weights, equity assets, total returns
Country 1952–1966 1966–1987 1987–2004 Series
United Kingdom 27.43 25.44 23.61 FT-Actuaries All-Share Total Return Index
Japan 17.20 15.95 14.80 Nikko Securities Composite Total Return
France 10.72 9.94 9.23 SBF-250 Total Return Index
The Netherlands 13.49 12.51 11.61 CBS Total Return-All Shares
Germany 8.19 7.60 7.05 CDAX Total Return Index
Canada 8.93 8.28 7.68 Toronto SE-300 Total Return Index
Sweden 4.89 4.54 4.21 Stockholm SBX Benchmark Gross Index
Switzerland 0.00 7.24 6.72 Performance Index
Italy 5.24 4.86 4.51 BCI Global Return Index
Mexico 0.00 0.00 3.79 SE Return Index
Australia 3.92 3.64 3.38 S&P/ASX 200 Accumulation Index
Brazil 0.00 0.00 3.4 São Paulo IBX-50 Return Index
Table 1B.2 Country-weights, equity assets, capital gains
Country 1952–1954 1954–2004 Series
United Kingdom 24.44 23.61 FT-Actuaries All-Share Index
Japan 15.33 14.80 Nikkei 225 Stock Average
France 9.55 9.23 SBF-250 Index
The Netherlands 12.02 11.61 CBS All-Share Price Index
Germany 7.30 7.05 CDAX Composite Price Index
Canada 7.95 7.68 S&P/TSX 300 Composite Index
Sweden 4.36 4.21 Aﬀarsvarlden General Index
Switzerland 6.95 6.72 Stock Indices-Composites—Switzerland Price Index
Italy 4.67 4.51 Banca Commerciale Italiana General Index
Mexico 3.93 3.79 SE Indice de Precios y Cotizaciones (IPC)
Australia 3.50 3.38 ASX All-Ordinaries
Brazil 0.00 3.40 Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo (Bovespa)ability, we cover 99 percent of the short-term debt positions. Short-
term local currency returns are converted into U.S. dollars using end-
of-period nominal exchange rates compiled from IFS after 1957 and
GFD before. The currency weights are reported in table 1B.4.
Capital Gains (RN$@RW). Same weights are [R$@RW] but use net re-
turns instead of total returns, where net returns are constructed as ln(1  
RN)   ln(1   R) – ln(1   Y), where RN is the net return, R is the total re-
turn, and Y is the yield. Local net returns are converted into dollars using
end-of-period exchange rates.
Direct Investment
Returns are constructed using rolling weights based on BEA’s FDI his-
torical cost positions, from 1966 to 2002. In each year, we cover 75 percent
of U.S. direct investment historical cost asset positions. Some countries are
excluded for some years due to the absence of stock market data (e.g., Mex-
ico, Brazil, Switzerland and Panama in early years). For each country, to-
tal stock return (in dollars) is computed from GFD total return indices and
IFS end-of-period exchange rates.
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Table 1B.3 Currency-weights, long-term debt assets
Weight 
Currency (%) Source
U.S. dollar 59.67 Yields on U.S. government ten-year constant maturity bonds (IFS)
Yen 12.35 Seven-year Government Bond Yield (OECD)
Canadian 
dollar 8.64 Average yield to maturity on government bonds with life over ten years (IFS)
German 
DMark 9.05 Yield on federal securities with residual maturities of over nine to ten years (IFS)
UK pound 5.35 Gross redemption bond yield, at par with twenty-year maturity (IFS)
French 
Franc 4.94 Ten-year Government Bond Yield (GFD)
Table 1B.4 Currency-weights, short-term debt assets
Weight 
Currency (%) Source
U.S. dollar 85.09 Discount on new issues of three-month Treasury Bill (IFS)
DMark 4.98 Germany three-month Treasury Bill Yield (GFD)
Yen 8.01 Lending rate for collateral and overnight loans in the Tokyo 
Call Money Market (IFS)
UK pound 1.92 Tender rate at which nine days bills are allotted (IFS)Total Return (TRFDR$).
Capital Gain (RFDR$).
Other Assets
Total Return (RSRW$). See the preceding.
Capital Gain. There is none.
Liabilities
Equity and Direct Investment
Total Return (EQTRUS). This is total return indices: Stocks—S&P 500
Composite Total Return Index (Base 1988; SPXTRQ).
Capital Gain (EQRUS). This is stock indices: Composites—S&P 500
Composite (SPXQ).
Debt
Total Return. This is the weighted average of the total return on long-term
bonds and total return on short-term bonds. Maturity composition is 75 per-
cent long term and 25 percent short term, from table 2 and table 3 in the U.S.
Treasury’s (2002) Survey of Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities.
• Long term (R@C111). This is the quarterly total return on long-term
bonds, calculated from the change in yields (see formula in Campbell,
Lo, and MacKinlay 1997, equation 10.1.19, page 408), assuming that
the yield is equal to the coupon. Yields are calculated on U.S. govern-
ment ten-year constant maturity bonds. Before the third quarter of
1985, yield data are from McCulloch and Kwon (1993), as reported by
Campbell (1999). After the third quarter of 1985, they are from IFS
(L61@C111).
• Short term (R$@C111). After the fourth quarter of 1963, discount is
on new issues of three-months Treasury bill (IFS L60@C111). Before
the fourth quarter of 1963, the Treasury bill rate is from quarterly
SBBI ﬁle in CRSP, which is from Campbell (1999).
Capital Gain (RN@C111). Quarterly net return on long-term bond is de-
ﬁned as ln(1   RN)   ln(1   R) – ln(1   Y), where RN is the net return, R
is the total return, and Y is the yield. The yield is already included in the
current account transactions.
Other Liability
Total Return (R$@C111). See the preceding.
52 Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Hélène ReyCapital Gain. There is none.
Implicit Returns
The implicit returns on each asset class are constructed as follows.
• For gross assets, we use the investment income series table F107, line 7
and SCB NIPA table 9.5, line 5 (receipts of factor income) and our to-
tal valuation series for assets. We compute ra as (investment income  
valuations)/foreign asset position at the end of the previous period.
• For gross liabilities, we use the investment income series table F107,
line 3 and SCB NIPA table 9.5, line 11 (payments of factor income)
and our total valuation series for liabilities. We compute rl as (invest-
ment income   valuations)/foreign liability position at the end of the
previous period.
• A breakdown of the investment income at the level of each asset class
is unfortunately not available over the entire period. Instead, we dis-
tributed investment income across each asset in the following way.
First, we deducted from total investment income FDI-reinvested earn-
ings. We distributed the remaining investment income across assets in
proportion to their share in total assets. Thus we obtain estimates of
investment income for equity, debt and other. For FDI, we add back
reinvested earnings to the FDI investment income estimated as in the
preceding, that is, we add reinvested earnings to (total investment in-
come-reinvested earnings) multiplied by share of FDI in total assets.
We then compute the implicit return on equity assets, say, in the fol-
lowing way: rae   (investment income on equity   valuation change
on equity)/equity asset position at the end of the previous period. We




Mapping the BEA Returns for Direct Investment 
and the Treatment of Reinvested Earning
Denote PXt the stock at the end of period t for series X and FXt the ﬂow
for the same period. Assume that the returns are accrued at the beginning
of the period so that the accumulation equation from quarter t to quarter 
t   1 takes the following form:
PXt 1   Rt 1PXt   FXt 1
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turn:
Rt 1  
We then regress the continuously compounded annual returns Rt,t 4  
ln(RtRt 1Rt 2Rt 3) on the annual return that is used to value the BEA 
series, RBEA
t,t 4.
How to Treat Discontinuities?
The accumulation equation assumes that NDt represents capital gains.
In some cases, the discontinuity is too big to be justiﬁed by capital gains.
Instead, it represents a rebasing of the underlying series (e.g., table F107,
line 26, U.S. corporate bond liabilities, or table F107, line 32, direct invest-
ment liability). The valuation equation is
PXt 1   PXt   FXt 1   DXt 1.
DXt reﬂects both the capital gain and the discontinuity in year t. If there is
a discontinuity at time T, we need to adjust both positions and ﬂows before
T. Our approach is to attribute all the adjustment at time T to the discon-
tinuity. Deﬁne the adjustment factor κ   1   DXt/PXT–1. We scale all po-
sitions, ﬂows, and previous discontinuities by κ for t   T:
PX ˆ
0   κPX0
FX ˆ
t   κFXt
References
Bernanke, Ben. 2005. The global saving glut and the U.S. current account deﬁcit.
Paper presented at Sandridge lecture, Virginia Association of Economics. 10
March, Richmond, Virginia.
Blanchard, Olivier, Francesco Giavazzi, and Filipa Sa. 2005. International in-
vestors, the U.S. current account, and the dollar. Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, Issue no. 1:1–65. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Campbell, John. 1999. Asset prices, consumption, and the business cycle. In Hand-
book of macroeconomics, ed. John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford, 1231–1303.
Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Campbell, John, Andrew Lo, and A. Craig MacKinlay. 1997. The econometrics of
ﬁnancial markets. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Cooper, Richard N. US deﬁcit: It is not only sustainable, it is logical. Financial
Times, October 31.
PXt 1   FXt 1   
PXt
54 Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Hélène ReyDespres, Emile, Charles Kindleberger, and Walter Salant. 1966. The dollar and
world liquidity: A minority view. The Economist 218 (5): 526–29.
Dooley, Michael P., David Folkerts-Landau, and Peter Garber. 2003. An essay on
the revived Bretton Woods System. NBER Working Paper no. 9971. Cambridge,
MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, September.
Eichengreen, Barry. 2004. Global imbalances and the lessons from Bretton Woods.
NBER Working Paper no. 10497. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, May.
Federal Reserve Board. 2000. Guide to the ﬂow of funds accounts.Washington, DC:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier, and Hélène Rey. 2005. International ﬁnancial adjust-
ment. NBER Working Paper no. 11155. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of
Economic Research, February.
Hooker, Sarah A., and John F. Wilson. 1989. A reconciliation of ﬂow of funds and
commerce department statistics on U.S. international transactions and foreign
investment position. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Un-
published Manuscript.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 1993. Balance of payments manual. 5th ed.
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Kindleberger, Charles. 1965. Balance of payments deﬁcits and the international
market for liquidity. Princeton Studies in International Finance, no. 46. Prince-
ton University, Department of Economics, International Finance Section.
Lane, Philip R., and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti. 2001. The external wealth of na-
tions: Measures of foreign assets and liabilities for industrial and developing
countries. Journal of International Economics 55:263–94.
———. 2004. Financial globalization and exchange rates. International Monetary
Fund. Mimeograph.
McCulloch, J. Huston, and Heon-Chul Kwon. 1993. U.S. term structure data, 1947–
1991. Working Paper 93-6. Ohio State University. http://www.econ.ohio-state
.edu/jhm/ts/mcckwon/mccull.htm.
Obstfeld, Maurice, and Alan Taylor. 2005. Sources of America’s exorbitant privi-
lege. University of California. Mimeograph.
Portes, Richard, and Hélène Rey. 1998. The emergence of the euro as an interna-
tional currency. Economic Policy (April): 305–43.
Roubini, Nouriel, and Brad Setser. 2004. The US as a net debtor: The sustainabil-
ity of the U.S. external imbalances. New York University. Mimeograph.
Tille, Cedric. 2003. The impact of exchange rate movements on U.S. foreign debt.
Current Issues in Economics and Finance 9 (1): 1–7.
———. 2004. Financial integration and the wealth eﬀect of exchange rate ﬂuctua-
tions. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Mimeograph.
Triﬃn, Robert. 1960. Gold and the dollar crisis: The future of convertibility. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
U.S. Department of the Treasury. 2000. U.S. holdings of foreign long-term securi-
ties as of December 1997 and December 1999. Department of the Treasury. Di-
vision of International Finance, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem. http://www.ustreas.gov/fpis/.
———. 2002. Survey of foreign portfolio holdings of U.S. securities, as of June
2002. Department of the Treasury, Division of International Finance, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. http://www.ustreas.gov/fpis/.
———. 2003. U.S. holdings of foreign long-term securities as of December 2001.
Department of the Treasury, Division of International Finance, Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System. http://www.ustreas.gov/fpis/.
From World Banker to World Venture Capitalist 55Comment José De Gregorio
In these notes I will ﬁrst discuss some salient features of the current U.S.
external imbalance, with a focus on its impact on emerging markets. Then
in the second section, I will discuss the relationship between exchange rate
ﬂuctuation and external adjustment, focusing on the quantitative impor-
tance of trade and valuation eﬀects. Finally, I will present some concluding
remarks.
The U.S. Current Account Deﬁcit
Today’s U.S. external imbalance is large and unsustainable as the United
States cannot borrow permanently at current levels. The United States is
the only major industrial country that has run a deﬁcit above 5 percent of
GDP since 1971 (Edwards 2005) and, given its weight in the world econ-
omy, the demand for foreign ﬁnancing is unprecedented.1 The origins of
the imbalance, the timing of the adjustment, the policy implications, and
the consequences are all sources of debate. At the core of the discussion is
the required adjustment in the exchange rates for global rebalancing.
The benign view, although recognizing that such a situation cannot per-
sist forever, would argue that the adjustment will occur with minor changes
in exchange rates and no disruptions in the world economy. A more pes-
simistic view would argue that a sharp exchange rate correction is neces-
sary for reallocating resources to the tradable-goods sector and for reduc-
ing domestic expenditure. This adjustment will not necessarily result in
global turmoil, but, of course, it entails more risks than the benign view.
Postponing action and adding to it a ﬁscal imbalance does not help to
smooth the correction.
A number of authors have recently highlighted an additional channel
through which exchange rates contribute to the external adjustment,
namely valuation eﬀects, also called the ﬁnancial adjustment channel (Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti 2001; International Monetary Fund [IMF] 2005; Tille
2003; Gourinchas and Rey 2005). Given that the foreign international in-
vestment position comprises many currencies, a depreciation will have val-
uation eﬀects, resulting in wealth transfers across countries. This new pa-
per by Gourinchas and Rey provides a detailed account of the foreign
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1. Backus and Lambert (2005), looking at historical data, dispute the view that there are no
precedents of this type of imbalances. However, they ﬁnd large deﬁcits during the Bretton
Woods period, where under ﬁxed exchange rates persistent imbalances were much more
likely, due to persistent misalignments. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2004) argue
that we are now getting closer to a new Bretton Woods system because of the heavy reserve
accumulation of Asian countries, especially China, to avoid an appreciation.investment position of the United States, reporting yields across diﬀerent
types of assets and liabilities, identifying the impact of a depreciation of the
dollar on diﬀerent yields, and discussing the channels through which the
exchange rate facilitates the adjustment, among many other interesting
discussions and insights.
The discussion on global imbalances has also been complemented by re-
cent research attempting to identify the main features of current account
reversals, initiated by the inﬂuential work of Milesi-Ferretti and Razin
(2000). Looking at U.S. history, perhaps the closest case of current account
reversal took place in the mid-1980s. Despite some diﬀerences, the accu-
mulated empirical evidence and an examination of the U.S. adjustment of
the mid-1980s show three relevant features:
• One is that current account reversals come with a slowdown of eco-
nomic growth (Freund and Warnock, chap. 4 in this volume). Accord-
ing to these authors, a 1 percentage point adjustment in the current ac-
count would result in a decline in GDP growth with respect to trend of
about 0.15 percentage points over the ﬁrst three years (ﬁgure 1C.1).
• Current account reversals are generally accompanied by sharp depre-
ciations of the currencies, causing, in some cases, a currency crisis
(Edwards 2005).2 Moreover, Freund and Warnock (chap. 4 in this vol-
ume) have found that the exchange rate adjustment is larger when the
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Fig. 1C.1 United States: Current account deﬁcit and GDP growth
Source: IMF.
2. Here I use the broad index of the real exchange rate reported by the Federal Reserve. An
increase in this index represents a real appreciation.current account deﬁcit is driven by consumption, not investment-
ﬁnancing. This is consistent with traditional models that predict that
in the absence of investment in the tradable sector, a larger deprecia-
tion is needed to reallocate resources to restore external balance (ﬁg-
ure 1C.2).
• The reversal of the current account deﬁcit in the mid-1980s came with
a surge of U.S. capital ﬂows to emerging markets. Indeed, the surge of
capital ﬂows to emerging economies documented by Calvo, Leider-
man, and Reinhart (1993) occurred when the demand of the United
States for foreign ﬁnancing declined (ﬁgure 1C.3). They suggest that
this phenomenon was caused by push factors, to a large extent inde-
pendent of developments in the emerging economies themselves. Fig-
ure 1C.3 shows that in recent years capital ﬂows to emerging markets
have been increasing, but mostly to Asia, particularly China, which is
receiving the bulk of capital ﬂows. In the case of China, these inﬂows
have not ﬁnanced a current account deﬁcit but have been used prima-
rily for reserve accumulation to ward oﬀ an appreciation of the ren-
minbi. In contrast, emerging markets with ﬂoating exchange rates, in
particular in Latin America, have seen very small net inﬂows as they
have been running current account surpluses. Therefore, the availabil-
ity of foreign ﬁnancing for emerging markets should rise as the U.S.
current account deﬁcit narrows.
Sooner or later there must be a reversal. The issue is whether this rever-
sal will be costly and what repercussions it will have on the global economy.
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Fig. 1C.2 United States: Current account deﬁcit and the real exchange rate
Source: IMF and U.S. Federal Reserve.I want to comment particularly on its impact on emerging market econ-
omies.
It is very likely that during the adjustment we will see a slowdown of
growth in the United States, a depreciation of the dollar, and a surge of cap-
ital ﬂows to emerging markets. The U.S. growth consensus forecast is al-
ready taking into account slower growth, which is falling from 4.4 percent
in 2004 to 3.2 percent in 2006. However, the magnitude of the reduction
should not cause major disruptions in the world economy as the United
States will be growing close to its long-term potential.
A depreciation of the dollar brings up the uncertainty about which cur-
rencies will take the burden. The euro seems more unlikely, and costly,
given weak economic performance in Europe. However, the adjustment
may be retarded while Asian countries defend their currencies from a
weakening dollar, building pressure on the rest of the currencies.
The question of whether these developments are good or bad news for
emerging economies has a mixed answer. The impact of a slowdown of
growth may be more than oﬀset by the positive eﬀect on capital ﬂows. Re-
garding the depreciation of the dollar, the evidence shows that commodity
prices increase when the dollar depreciates (Dornbusch 1985). Indeed, the
signiﬁcant gain in terms of trade experienced by commodity exporting
countries has coincided with the depreciation of the dollar that has taken
place since mid-2002 (see ﬁgure 1C.4).
Perhaps where we know least is interest rate adjustment. This evidence
is more uncertain, in particular because of the low levels of long rates de-
spite the large ﬁscal deﬁcit of the United States. Naturally, a sharp increase
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Fig. 1C.3 U.S. Current account deﬁcit and capital ﬂows to emerging economies
Sources: IFS and IMF.in interest rates could result in ﬁnancial turmoil in developing countries,
the more so the larger their debts.
Of course we can predict catastrophic scenarios, but they are improba-
ble as the world economy is better prepared for signiﬁcant adjustment to
global imbalances. From the standpoint of emerging economies, some pos-
itive developments, such as those mentioned previously, may facilitate the
adjustment. In addition, emerging economies are today in a better position
than they were in the last twenty-ﬁve years to face diﬃculties in the exter-
nal front. Inﬂation is under control. The external sector exhibits current ac-
count surpluses in most countries; for example, in Latin America this
could be about 75 billion U.S. dollars during 2005. Fiscal deﬁcit in Latin
America is slightly over 1 percent of GDP, showing unprecedented ﬁscal
prudence, and hence the demand for foreign ﬁnancing is limited. This is
also reﬂected in improved sovereign ratings for these countries.
The evidence reported by Gourinchas and Rey helps to better under-
stand the channels through which an exchange rate correction in the
United States contributes to external adjustment, and I will refer to this in
more detail in the next section.
Valuation versus Trade Eﬀects
Consider the following equation for the dynamics of net foreign asset
(NFA) accumulation:
(C1) NXt   (1   rt
a)At   (1   rl
t)Lt   NFAt 1,
where NX stands for net exports, A is foreign assets with a return equal
to ra, L is foreign liabilities with a return rl, and NFA is net foreign assets
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Fig. 1C.4 Real exchange rate and commodity prices (January 1973   100)
Sources: Commodity Research Bureau and U.S. Federal Reserve.(A – L). Expressing the previous equation as share of GDP we have (using
lowercases to denote shares of GDP)
(C2) (1   rl
t)nfat    [nxt   (rt
a   rl
t)at]   (1    t 1)nfat 1.
Net exports are a function of the exchange rate, where e denotes its log,
and a set of other variables that for the purposes of this discussion will be
omitted. As argued by many authors and carefully documented by Gour-
inchas and Rey most of U.S. foreign liabilities are denominated in dollars,
while part of assets are denominated in foreign currency, which generates
the valuation eﬀect. However, the valuation eﬀect must be in real terms be-
cause returns in dollars could compensate for changes in the price of the
currencies. Indeed, what really matters for the valuation eﬀects are unex-
pected changes in the exchange rate. For this reason, the return on foreign
assets will depend on the rate of depreciation, which proxies for unex-
pected changes in the exchange rate.
When the dollar depreciates, there is a once-and-for-all gain in valua-
tion. Therefore, I assume that ra depends on the rate of depreciation,  e.
On the other hand, just for simplicity, I will assume that rl is constant and
equal to r and the rate of growth is also constant and equal to  . Integrat-
ing forward equation (C2), considering the appropriate no-Ponzi game
condition, we have the following intertemporal budget constraint.3




This expression describes many exchange rates’ equilibrium paths as
more structure is needed to pin down a unique path.4 But this equation
shows that postponing an adjustment will require a more depreciated ex-
change rate in the future. The reason is that an appreciated exchange rate
will result in a deterioration of the net foreign assets position, which im-
plies that in the future more net exports will be needed.
From the perspective of Gourinchas and Rey’s paper, the most impor-
tant point of equation (C3) is that a depreciation has a permanent eﬀect on
net exports and a one-time valuation eﬀect. Indeed, the estimations of
Gourinchas and Rey show that a 10 percent depreciation of the dollar gen-
erates between a 2 and 3 percentage points decline in the return on foreign
assets, for an average return of about 7 percent. On the side of liabilities, a
10 percent depreciation of the dollar produces an increase in the return on
foreign liabilities between 1 and 1.5 percentage points, for an average re-
turn of about 4 percent. Their estimations stress some important features
regarding the current U.S. foreign investment position:
nx(et s)   [ra( et s)   r]at s    
(1   r    )s
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3. Strictly speaking, r, the return on liabilities, also depends on the exchange rate. This will
be considered when doing a numerical application below.
4. For example, asset markets equilibrium in a world of imperfect asset substitutability is a
natural candidate, as done in Kuori (1983) or Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2005).1. The United States enjoys an exorbitant privilege because ra   rl, and
this diﬀerence is about 3 percentage points. Therefore, the United States
can run a permanent deﬁcit in net exports, despite having a negative inter-
national investment position.
2. From equation (1) we see that the exorbitant privilege is given by raA
– rlL, which can even become negative if external liabilities surpass assets
by a large enough margin. Indeed, Gourinchas and Rey show that we are
close to that point because at current rates, diﬀerential L/A must be less
than 1.6, and it is currently at 1.34, which is close and approaching 1.6
while the deﬁcit continues.
3. Another important aspect that can be seen in the budget constraint is
that a depreciation of the U.S. dollar facilitates external adjustment not
only via an increase in net exports but also via valuation eﬀects. The valu-
ation eﬀect is due to the fact that radepends on the depreciation. The diﬀer-
ence between the exorbitant privilege and the valuation eﬀect is that the
former depends on a persistent diﬀerence between the return on assets and
the return on liabilities, while the valuation eﬀect depends on unexpected
changes in valuation due to changes in the exchange rate.
The eﬀect of exchange rates on the return on foreign assets and liabilities
for a number of industrial countries has been examined by Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2005). They ﬁnd that the eﬀects of a real depreciation on
foreign assets’ returns for the United States is the smallest as the United
States has probably the largest share of assets denominated in dollars. But
on the side of liabilities, the United States is the only country where a real
depreciation does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect returns, consistently with the fact
that most U.S. liabilities are denominated in dollars. For the rest of indus-
trial countries, a real depreciation increases the return on liabilities. In net
terms, the United States is the country that beneﬁts the most from a real
depreciation.
In the recent experience with the widening of the U.S. current account
deﬁcit, many observers have argued that globalization facilitates the external
adjustment. The budget constraint in equation (C3) also serves to illustrate
this point. Increased globalization implies that, for a given net asset position
(nfa), gross assets (a) are larger. In the presence of the exorbitant privilege,
globalization helps the external adjustment. In the transition to a larger par-
ticipation of U.S. assets in global portfolio, the United States may have
massive ﬁnancing available.
However, this eﬀect has its limits. Increased demand for safe assets and
global portfolio adjustment may lead to an increase in U.S. liabilities and
assets. However, the increase in a is not unlimited, and it is diﬃcult to jus-
tify that an increase in the international investment position of the United
States can be sustained without a reduction in the exorbitant privilege. As
Roubini and Setser (2004, 6) put it: “the U.S. should not count on being
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ciation of the US dollar would lead foreigners to require ex-ante higher re-
turns on their US dollar asset holdings to minimize their capital losses.”
This approach can be used to estimate the eﬀects of a real depreciation
on external adjustment, adding up the valuation and trade eﬀects. Gour-
inchas and Rey estimate the required depreciation to bring the economy to
the steady state in one, three, and ﬁve years. In one year, a 75 percent de-
preciation would be required, and as the period lengthens, the depreciation
must increase because during the transition to the steady state, the econ-
omy is increasing its negative foreign asset position. While interesting, this
exercise may be unrealistic as the economy will adjust over the long run to
the steady state, and this should be enough to keep solvency as indicated
by the intertemporal budget constraint.
We can compute constant levels for net exports and the interest rate di-
ﬀerential that keep net foreign assets at a constant value equal to n  f  a  . We
can also compute the required exchange rate depreciation to achieve this.
The valuation eﬀect operates only in the period in which the depreciation
takes place, from then on the exorbitant privilege persists, but with no
gains from the exchange rate, which is assumed to be constant. Solving
equation (C3) for constant nx and a, a once-and-for-all valuation gain at
time t, and the remaining exorbitant privilege, we have that (ignoring
growth)
(C4) r   n  f  a    nx(e  )   (ra(e    e0)   r)a   (ra   r)a,
where e  – e0is the depreciation needed to achieve a constant level of net for-
eign assets. The ﬁrst term is net exports, the second is the valuation gain at
t for a depreciation from e0 to e, and the third one is the ﬂow of the exorbi-
tant privilege.
We can use this expression to compute the eﬀects of a depreciation on
external adjustment. This is just an expansion of the traditional elasticity
approach to consider valuation eﬀects. However, we need to take into ac-
count that the valuation eﬀect is a once-and-for-all eﬀect, and for this rea-
son it appears in equation (C4) as the annuity of the change in returns in
the period in which the depreciation takes place. The last term of equation
(C4) is not aﬀected by the exchange rate, which I assume to remain con-
stant after the depreciation happens.
Diﬀerentiating equation (C4) with respect to e we have that a change in
de will induce an external adjustment of Λ given by
(C5) Λ   de   de.
Using Gourinchas and Rey’s parameters, we have that ∂nx/∂e   1/15  
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From World Banker to World Venture Capitalist 63foreign assets to gross domestic product (GDP) of 76 percent, we can cal-
culate the valuation eﬀect by using ∂ra/∂ e estimated by Gourinchas and
Rey. However, we must also take into account that the return on liabilities
is aﬀected by a depreciation as well. The semielasticity of returns on assets
in one year estimated by Gourinchas and Rey is 0.28, for assets being 76
percent of GDP, while the semielasticity for the return on liabilities is
–0.08, for liabilities being 103 percent of GDP. Therefore, a rough estimate
for the gain in returns on net assets deriving from a 1 percent depreciation,
expressed with respect to assets, is 0.28   0.08   (103/76)   0.39. There-
fore, we have that the valuation eﬀect is 0.04   0.76   0.39/1.04   0.011.
Then a 10 percent depreciation would result in a total eﬀect of 0.78 per-
cent. The valuation eﬀect accounts for only 14 percent of the total eﬀect.5
An adjustment of 3 percent of GDP would require a 38 percent depreci-
ation (3/0.078). If there were no valuation eﬀect, the required depreciation
would be 45 percent. Figures are similar to those of Blanchard, Giavazzi,
and Sa (2005), Edwards (2005), and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (chap. 9 in this
volume).
The lesson from these simple calculations is that the valuation eﬀect has
a small impact on external adjustment. The reason is simply that it is a one-
time eﬀect. A back-of-the-envelope calculation may clarify the point. As
argued in the Gourinchas and Rey’s introduction, a 10 percent deprecia-
tion represents 5 percent of GDP transfer from the rest of the world to the
United States. As an annuity this would be 0.2 percent of GDP, a ﬁgure
somewhat larger than the 0.11 percent one obtains from the semielastici-
ties of returns computed by Gourinchas and Rey. The reason is that, as
argued by Gourinchas and Rey, the covariates of the returns reduce the
eﬀects of the depreciation. For example, a depreciation reduces the returns
on assets, but this depreciation could result in an increase in the value of
the stocks in dollars, for example, in the tradable sector, which would partly
oﬀset the direct gain—losses for foreign investors—from valuation.
In summary, although the valuation eﬀects are conceptually important
and may play an important role in the short run, over the long run, trade
eﬀects remain playing the lead part.
A caveat to this calculation is that these eﬀects do not necessarily imply
that welfare eﬀects from valuation are necessary. Indeed, Tille (2004) has
modeled the welfare eﬀects from valuation and found that they are not
small. The reason is that a depreciation aﬀords greater consumption due
to high net exports and gains in valuation. But in order for the trade chan-
nel to operate, an increase in net exports requires more work. In contrast,
the valuation eﬀect entails a wealth transfer that does not need extra work
and, hence, has no costs from the welfare viewpoint.
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5. According to Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (chap. 9 in this volume), the valuation eﬀect would
represent 20 percent of the total eﬀect of a depreciation.Concluding Remarks
In these comments I have argued that the valuation eﬀect, although sig-
niﬁcant in the short run, is much less important from a longer-term view.
Indeed, the exchange rate adjustment operates mainly through the tradi-
tional trade eﬀect.
In the short run, and particularly from the point of view of emerging
economies, the valuation eﬀect could be more important. Short-term
movements in capital ﬂows could be partially oﬀset by changes in valua-
tion. This is related to the notion that one key problem of emerging econ-
omies is that they cannot borrow in their own currencies. Therefore, when
the domestic currency depreciates, the return on liabilities increases in
terms of local goods. The burden of liabilities rises. For industrialized
countries, the valuation eﬀect operates in the other direction, helping the
external adjustment.
A typical case in point as a good example is Australia, where, according
to the estimations of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005), a 10 percent depre-
ciation reduces the return on net foreign liabilities by about 2 percent,
somewhat less than the 5 percent for the United States.
Whether the inability of many economies to borrow internationally in
their own currencies is the original sin (Eichengreen and Hausman 1999),
this discussion highlights the importance of international risk sharing. And
precisely in moments where international ﬁnancial markets stop lending to
emerging markets, the ensuing depreciation will ameliorate the negative im-
pact on countries that have been able to borrow in their own currencies.
From the point of view of current global imbalances, a current account
reversal should occur sooner or later; a depreciation of the dollar should
help, but the contribution of valuation eﬀects will still be limited.
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